

SMALLEY
NOTES

Cicero

Tusculan Disputations. V

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INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

—TO THE—

FIFTH BOOK

—OF—

CICERO'S

TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS

—BY—

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PREFATORY NOTE.

The Introduction and annotations here presented are advance sheets. They are printed now because needed for immediate use. The plan is to extend the latter to other portions of the text, and briefly to extend and adapt the former to the same. Some Latin text of the Disputations, as Teubner's or Harper's, will be used in the class.

No scholar can feel any degree of confidence or any assurance of competence to present a commentary on this composition of Cicero without first devoting much thoughtful study to the great German editors, whose works have done so much to furnish a correct text and a clear exposition of the sometimes obscure passages, elucidating the author's thought. Reference is made especially to the works of Wolf, Moser and Kühner. Use has been constantly made of the edition of Heine, and especially of Tischer's (Sorof) last (eighth), on whose text the notes are based. Independent additions have been made where it was deemed that the interest of a clear exposition demanded; especially is this true of comments of a biographical and philosophical character.

A few grammatical references have been inserted. The design in reading this Latin should not be so much the study of the language as of the thought; and the student should have little need of grammatical instruction, but be able to give his attention almost exclusively to the style, the elevated tone, the general line of thought and the philosophical questions discussed. As a necessary preparation for understanding the philosophy, the introduction has been prepared; for, the reader who has not previously devoted some attention to ancient philosophy, would, when introduced thus, "*in medias res*," be quite incapable of comprehending the author. He must first fix in mind the ethical teachings of this philosophy, the discussion of which constitutes the substance of the work, and with which the author assumes that his reader has a reasonable familiarity. Such

preparation, moreover, is especially important in this case; first, because this book is the last of a series, the writer naturally assuming that the books have been perused in order; second, because the work, as a whole, followed in time of composition other philosophical writings of the author to which it stands related, as the practical to the theoretical. In the five books *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* he had treated of the foundation of ethics, the doctrine of the highest good and of evil; the *Tusculanae Disputationes* followed, in which he showed what things are necessary to the greatest happiness in life.

If we were to specify narrowly the knowledge most indispensable to the student at the outset, it would be this: the ethical views of Aristotle, of the Old Academy, of the Stoics and of the Epicureans, of Carneades of the Middle Academy, of Antiochus of the New Academy, and of Cicero himself. See INTRODUCTION; (and for Cicero), III. THE ECLECTICS.

The helps made use of in preparing the commentary are sufficiently indicated above. In the philosophical introduction the more important works consulted are as follows: History of Philosophy, Dr. F. Ueberweg, translated by Morris, vol. 1; A Sketch of Ancient Philosophy, J. B. Mayor; A Brief History of Greek Philosophy, Burt; Christianity and Greek Philosophy, Cocker; A Short History of Greek Philosophy, Marshall; Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius, translated by Yonge; Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Zeller, translated by Reichel.

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SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY,
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INTRODUCTION.

I. THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS.

Cicero tells us in the first book that the five books of the Tusculan Disputations are the record of the five days discussion of philosophic questions at his Tusculan villa (whence the name), each book representing the discussion of a day. The questions considered have a practical application to life, and the treatise is a contribution to moral philosophy. It was begun in the year 45 B. C. and finished the following year. The form of each book is that of a dialogue—not as in his other works, between equals—but one of his pupils or friends suggests a thesis and briefly attempts to maintain it, after which Cicero, having refuted his views, proceeds almost without interruption to discuss the topic at length. The popular method of presentation, the easy flow of thought, and above all the elevated and noble moral tone combine to delight the reader. However it must be admitted that there is a weakness in his arguments and a lack of keenness in his logic compared with the dialectic of Plato which is his model. “The Tusculan Disputations is a work of despair. When Cicero wrote them, Italy was given over to Cæsar and the host of tribunes and centurions who had conquered license in his train. Everything but good conscience seemed lost beyond recovery; and Cicero strove to convince himself, in convincing the young yet uncorrupted by the world, that to keep a good conscience through everything is enough, and more than enough; that to know this is our main concern; and that glory and success and all externals are so secondary that the inquiry as to whether they add anything more or less to virtue only serves curiosity, if, indeed, it does not lower courage. Even the style is affected by the reckless earnestness of the writer, and becomes more animated and pathetic, and at the same time less pure.” The above quotation from Simcox states the circumstances under which the work was composed and partially sets forth the object the author had in view. More specif-

ically, it may be stated that the great object was to assure himself and his readers that amidst all the evils of life (I use the expression in its popular sense) there is one secure refuge—namely, virtue, and that virtue insures happiness under all circumstances. Man has thus in his own power all that is necessary for happiness.

The first book speaks of the proper attitude toward death, holding that it is not an evil, and is to be looked upon with indifference if not actually regarded as a blessing; the second book teaches us that bodily pain, although an evil, can be overcome by the exercise of reason and self-control; the third book refutes the proposition that the wise man is subject to grief or sorrow. Cicero says: "Your question was concerning a wise man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil, that is not dishonorable; or at least anything else would seem so small an evil, that by his wisdom he would so overmatch it, as to make it wholly disappear." The fourth book has reference to other emotions or passions of the mind, the thesis being thus stated: "*Non omni animi perturbatione sapiens potest vacare.*" This is refuted on the Stoic principle that no man can be called virtuous who has not gotten rid of all emotions or passions, or the beliefs which give rise to these irrational impulses. "But certainly the most effectual cure is to be achieved by showing that all perturbations are of themselves vicious, and have nothing natural or necessary in them." The fifth book maintains that virtue in itself is sufficient to insure a happy life, which is related to the thesis of the preceding books as the universal to the particular, the containing to the contained. It is a comprehensive statement of a general proposition involving all the questions that were proposed, discussed and settled in harmony with it in the preceding books. This book is justly regarded as the most pleasing and attractive of the five.

II. ARGUMENT OF BOOK V.


The first four chapters are introductory. Reference is made to the opinion of Brutus that virtue is sufficient of itself to insure a happy life—a truth of the highest importance, but one which the infirmity of human nature leads him sometimes to distrust, until, by reflection on the power of virtue, he corrects his judgment, (1). Philosophy here must be our guide; whereupon he breaks into an enthusiastic panegyric of philosophy, which is praised as of the utmost service to men, but which is even maligned by some who do not realize its value and antiquity, (2). A brief summary of the earliest philosophy, especially of the wise men of antiquity, follows—extending down to Pythagoras who invented the term philosopher, whom he (Pythagoras) compared to the spectators at the Grecian games, thus earnestly contemplating nature, (3). Philosophy before the time of Socrates was mostly natural philosophy. Socrates applied it to life and morals. Many sects followed. The Socratic method will be pursued, (4). The Auditor says that virtue does not seem to him sufficient to insure a happy life, and maintains that thesis by declaring that, while virtue may exist under torture and on the rack, happiness cannot, (5). Reference is made by M. (Magister?) to the conclusions of the preceding books which quite seem to settle the question; for if virtue has fortune in her power, and is beyond the reach of fear and anxiety, desire and vain joy, it must insure happiness, (6). A. is convinced of his error; notwithstanding, M. proceeds, saying that, while mathematicians prove a point and then leave it, philosophers are accustomed to discuss such points separately; and this is a very important point, for philosophy promises to make man forever happy, (7). The inconsistency of the Academics, especially of Antiochus, is pointed out, who holds that virtue of itself can make happy but not perfectly happy; that things are estimated from their predominant constituent; and that there are three classes of evils, and that one can be happy even under evil, (8). The Peripatetics (Theophrastus) reason consistently, but from wrong

premises. They hold to three kinds of goods (and corresponding evils) and that evil may befall a good man, destroying happiness. Epicurus is blamed for commanding temperance and at the same time making pleasure the chief good, and for defying fortune while regarding pain as the sole or greatest evil, (9). Happiness must be absolute enjoyment of good without any evil; so virtue, as indispensable to happiness, must be the only good. Otherwise the evils corresponding to goods—as pain, poverty, etc., might befall the good or wise man, and if regarded as evils be inconsistent with happiness. Aristotle and the Academics cannot be permitted to say that a wise man is always happy and at the same time hold their view of evils, nor can Epicurus with his view of pain, (10). Cicero had endeavored to show in the fourth book *de Finibus*, that the difference between the Stoics and the Peripatetics on this subject is one of words only, and justifies his inconsistency on the ground of adherence to the Academy. The question here is, admitting that virtue is the only good, is it alone sufficient for a happy life, (11). And this doctrine is due to Plato and before him to Socrates. Plato in the speech of Pericles says that the happy man is unaffected by externals, has control of his passions, and is entirely dependent on himself, (12). Beginning with nature it is shown that every creature (plant or animal) is designed to reach its perfect development, the animal in a higher sphere than the plant, and man, endowed with reason, in the highest sphere—that of reason which is identical with virtue; and, as whatever lacks nothing is happy, virtue in man implies happiness. Brutus, Aristotle and the Old Academy believe this, (13). But Cicero holds more, namely, that it implies complete happiness. Those who make three classes of goods must be in doubt, as being dependent on unreliable goods. The happy man must be free from all apprehension of the loss of that which makes happy, and of all fear. Courage that admits any fear is not true courage. Add to courage self-control, and what can be wanting to happiness? (14). The wise man regards grief and fear as arising from imagined evils, and pleasure and desire from imagined goods—and all opposed to reason. He is happy because unaffected by them. The true good produces joy, and is honorable, (i. e. morally good). The honorable alone is good, so that honesty (moral goodness) alone makes a happy life. These cannot be goods of which one may have an

abundance, as of wealth, honors, etc., and yet be unhappy. Take away the morally good (*honestum*) and you take away happiness. The honorable is again defined as the only good; if not such, many other things are entitled to be called goods, (15). Nothing external can be called a good in the true sense. The Stoics give the designation *preferred* to some of the so-called goods of others, but do not, as others do, regard them as essential to happiness, or to the greatest happiness. An argument from Socrates is introduced which is based on the harmony of a man's life with his mental disposition. If his disposition is morally good his life will be the same and therefore happy. Then follows a resumé of arguments with the conclusion that a happy life is consequent on virtue, (16). A comparison between a happy and an unhappy life is made and leads to the result that only the happy life can have a praiseworthy character, and must therefore be virtuous. Finally the conclusion is reached by a comparison of vice with virtue, that as the former renders life miserable, the latter must render it happy, (17). The reality of the Stoic's proof is again briefly summarized, (18); and for the confirmation of the same a number of examples of virtuous and of wicked statesmen are presented, (19, 20, 21, 22, 23-); also several philosophers are mentioned, and finally the activity and the happiness of the wise man is pictured in detail, (-23, 24, 25). Then follows a refutation of the objections which seem to have some force against the Stoic view that virtue is able to produce a happy life, and since the view that pain is an evil is the strongest argument that threatens the proof of that proposition, Cicero reminds us that even Epicurus asserts that he can be happy in spite of the most intense sufferings, and a number of facts and illustrations to the same effect are cited, (26, 27, 28, 29-). Cicero takes advantage of his agnosticism to show a spirit of fair dealing with all views and to show that, however they differ, virtue is still able to insure a happy life. Various opinions of the good are enumerated and some of them discussed. He comes back again to the question of pain, and, in connection with it, of death; pain cannot destroy happiness for the Peripatetics or even the Epicureans, (-29, 30, 31). Poverty—twin of pain—is next discussed and Epicurus commended. He shows how easily poverty is endured by others as well as by the Stoics, (32, 34, 35). And amid these illustrations are set forth the practical directions of

Epicurus concerning the striving for pleasure, (33). Obscurity also and unpopularity cannot prevent a wise man from being happy, (36); nor can banishment, (37). The same is true of all griefs and anxieties, of blindness, and deafness, which afflictions are not to be considered in comparison with the many pleasures of life which are at the command of the wise man. But let all these misfortunes meet in one person, together with acute bodily pain, still he may escape by a voluntary death, (38, 39, 40). If those philosophers who hold the honorable and laudable as of no value can maintain that the wise man is always happy, what must be the case with philosophers who derive from Socrates and Plato? All come so near together on this question that Cicero expresses his gratification that it is thus satisfactorily solved, and he closes with the remark that he can best alleviate his own afflictions by devoting his leisure to philosophical study and composition, (41).

For a less detailed analysis, see Klotz's *Argumentum* in the Teubner text or in Harper's.



III. A BRIEF VIEW OF GREEK AND ROMAN ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY.

The earliest philosophy was a natural philosophy. It concerned itself with the problem of nature and the universe, and the individual was lost sight of in the study of the universal. It was not until the Sophists appeared that thought was directed to man instead of nature, and philosophy became subjective. The Sophists were not philosophers in the highest sense. They were rhetoricians and grammarians and teachers of youth, the professors of the "higher education," and of "practical" philosophy. However, they did speculate on the nature of human volition and thought, and thus prepared the way for a profounder study of man, for ethics and a better dialectic. There was need of a great genius to rescue philosophy from the chaos into which it had fallen by the study of nature and the perversions of the Sophists, to take up and extend the principle of subjectivism introduced by the latter, and to consider man in his universal as well as his individual nature; to maintain the certainty of moral distinctions, and establish a scientific method for detecting error and determining truth; in a word, to recognize, through the laws of thinking and moral willing, the relation of man to the objective world. Such a genius appeared in Socrates, and although he wrote no treatise, and did not profess to teach, but simply to stimulate thought by means of keen questioning, he marks an era in philosophy.

(a) ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF SOCRATES.

SOCRATES was the father of moral philosophy. It is true there had been some ethical speculations by the natural philosophers, particularly by Anaxagoras, by Democritus, and by the Sophists, but it was left for Socrates to investigate the law of conduct. He did not build up a system of ethics, his efforts being limited to testing men and leading them to rigorous self-examination. "The fundamental conception of Socrates was the inseparable union of theoretical insight with practical moral excellence." And so virtue is knowledge, and vice is ignorance. No man willingly sins, but only as the result of ignorance, for every man desires happiness and the only road to happiness is through virtue, while knowledge (scientific knowledge, wisdom) is the sole condition to virtue. "To

do wrong wittingly is better than to do right ignorantly. Character and deliberate choice, consequently, were not regarded by Socrates as elements of virtue." Virtue is the necessary result of knowledge, If a man is virtuous he is realizing what is best and truest in himself, he is fulfilling what is best and truest without himself; he "has come to a knowledge evidencing itself in works expressive of the law that is in him, as he is in it." "Therefore the law of virtuous growth is expressed in the maxim 'know thyself'; that is, realize thyself; by obedience and self-control come to your full stature." Virtue can be taught, because knowledge can be acquired, and further, because of this unity of virtue and knowledge the virtues are one, having a common essence in wisdom. Thus temperance, friendship, courage, justice and piety are only different expressions of wisdom. The Good is the highest object of knowledge. It is a condition like the gods to have no wants, and the less one wants the nearer he comes to this ideal. External goods confer no advantage. Socrates regarded physical speculation as unprofitable and even impious, but pious conduct was the just due of Deity, because of his care for men and his manifested wisdom. He believed in an omnipotent and invisible Supreme Being who rules the universe.

The greatest of the disciples of Socrates was Plato. There were, however, several others termed the Lesser Socratics, who founded schools, each mainly characterized by some particular feature of the Socratic teachings. Of these, two treated chiefly of ethical questions, namely, the Cynic and the Cyrenaic Schools.

(b) THE CYNICS. SEE IX. 26, NOTE.

ANTISTHENES, the founder of the Cynic school, had been a pupil of Gorgias the Sophist, before coming to Socrates. It is a question whether the name of the school was derived from a gymnasium—The Cynosarges—where Antisthenes taught, or from *κυνικός*, *dogish*, from their churlish manners. The Cynics were the ascetics of philosophy, and they magnified the Socratic principle of self-control and superiority to appetite. Virtue is the only good, vice the only evil. Everything else is indifferent. "Virtue is wisdom and the wise man is always perfectly happy because he is self-sufficient and has no wants, no ties and no weaknesses." The Cynic aimed at liberty through self-denial. He did not however despise all pleas-

ures as Antisthenes shows in these remarks, "when I wish a treat I do not go and buy it at great cost in the market place; I find my storehouse of pleasures in the soul;" and, "follow the pleasures that come after pains, not those which bring pains in their train." He sought to train body and mind so as to attain independence, and so that the very refusal of pleasure would be itself a pleasure. Virtue was declared to be teachable and when once acquired could never be lost. Believing civilization corrupt he sought to return to a state of nature, to become a citizen of the *world* in distinction from existing society. His ideal is then expressed in the words, liberty, free-speech and independence. This resulted in boorishness, indecency, shabbiness of dress, insolence, and ostentatious asceticism. Hegel truly says, "The Cynics excluded themselves from the sphere in which is true freedom." The most famous of the Cynics was Diogenes of Sinope. He is described as "conceited, scurrlous, witty, a caricature of Socrates, sleeping in porticoes, coarsely and scantily clad, living on the rudest fare, drinking water from the palm of his hand, violating all rules of decency, railing at whatever and whomsoever he whimsically conceived a dislike to; an admired, privileged 'Dog' indeed." All this excess came from the exaggeration of principles in themselves good, the superiority of man to his environment, simplicity of life, frankness and sincerity in speech.

Stoicism with its mental culture was indebted to cynicism.

(c) THE CYRENAICS.

ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene founded the Cyrenaic School. Although of a luxurious city and possessed of wealth and fond of good living, he was attracted by Socrates and became his disciple. His means and social condition naturally affected his views. The Socratic doctrine of self-control was capable of interpretations that might lead to very diverse results in the practical conduct of life. Antisthenes and the Cynics, as we have seen, interpreted and applied it in practice with the result of taking pleasure in the very denial of pleasure and in a severely ascetic mode of life. And to some extent they had the example of Socrates to plead in favor of their practice. On the other hand Socrates did sometimes go to great lengths in convivial indulgence, never, however, losing self-control. Pleasure and self-control, with the emphasis on the first, was the fundamental ethical

principle of Aristippus. "The Socratic element in the doctrine of Aristippus appears in the principle of self-determination directed by knowledge, and in the control of pleasure as a thing to be acquired through knowledge and culture."

The Cyrenaics first gave prominence to a phrase much used later, namely, the *end* of existence, meaning by it that which is good in and for itself, and not as a *means* to anything else, and in fact, "sums up the good in existence." With them the *end* of life is pleasure; hence the term Hedonism (from *ἡδονή*, *pleasure*) often applied to the school. The pleasure meant is the pleasure of each moment, with little regard for the past or the future, the present only being in our power. Virtue,—the good,—and pleasure are identical. The wise man is therefore the man who enjoys pleasure but keeps it under his control; but wisdom—intellectual culture—is essential to this enjoyment. The sage is subject to grief and fear. He is not always happy. All pleasures as such are good and equally desirable, whether arising from a good or bad cause or source. "Duration and degree determines their worth." Pleasure is defined as a gentle motion, "a tranquil activity of the being, like the gently heaving sea, midway between violent motion which was pain and absolute calm which was insensibility." It was not mere absence of pain, but something positive.

The criterion of truth for each man is his feeling of the moment. There is therefore no common criterion of good or truth. Although we may use the same words the thing indicated will vary with each man. This is like the teaching of the Sophist Protagoras.

Aristippus is said to have been much at the courts of the Dionysii—the elder and the younger,—at Syracuse, and to have met Plato at both. *Arete*, the daughter of Aristippus, was among his prominent disciples, and her son, the younger *Aristippus*, was of great service to the school by giving it systematic form. Modification of the doctrines came through the discovery of their incompatibility. For what consistency is there in holding that the pleasure of the moment is the highest good, and at the same time that the wise man controls pleasure and is not controlled by it? Too much scope is thus given to external circumstances, too little to wisdom. Nearly a century after Aristippus, therefore, *Theodorus, the Atheist*, substituted for the passing pleasure, which he held to be indifferent, "a calm and

cheerful frame of mind." See I. XLIII. 102; V. XL. 117. *Euhemerus*, the Rationalist, taught that "belief in the existence of gods, began with the veneration of distinguished men." *Hegesias*, convinced that there is more pain than pleasure in life, held that the highest good is to avoid trouble; "he despaired of positive happiness and considered life to be intrinsically valueless," which comes near to the conclusions of the Cynics. I. XXXIV. 83.

(d) PLATO.

PLATO. The Platonic Ethics are so related to his Theory of Ideas that a brief statement of that theory is necessary. Aristotle states that Plato's mind was influenced, first, by the Heraclitean doctrine of the constant flux or flow of things in the Universe and the conclusion from this that there can be no absolute knowledge; and second, by Socrates' perpetually searching for definition, and, in his ethical inquiries, always seeking for universals. Plato accepted the view that there must be conceptions that are ever invariable and he reasoned that these could not belong to the objects of sense, because these are constantly changing, but to another kind of existence. Thus he conceives "of universals as forms or *ideas* of real existences." Any concrete object, for example, as a book, affords us a passing sensation merely, but we may rise by abstraction to the contemplation of the *ideal* of book which is a universal. [It was with reference to this doctrine that Antisthenes remarked, "O Plato, I see horses, but no horsemanship." Whereupon Plato replied that it was because he had no eye for it.] "If we approach the Ideal from below, from the concrete particulars, it takes the form of the class, the common name, the definition, the concept, the Idea; but this is an incomplete view of it. The Ideal exists apart from, and prior to, all concrete embodiment. It is the eternal archetype of which the sensible objects are the copies. It is because the soul in its pre-existent state is already familiar with this archetype, that it is capable of being reminded of it when it sees its shadow in the phenomenal existences which make up the world of sense." The highest of all the Ideas is the Idea of the Good—which he identifies with God, the first great Cause, the Supreme Intelligence. Further, he says, "The soul is that which most partakes of the Divine." It is by virtue of this that we are capable of knowledge. This participation in the

divine Idea is the connection between the divine and the human reason and provides man with the primordial laws of thought and reason. But these Ideas are regarded by Plato as the archetypes, as "the eternal patterns to which the artificer of the world looks in framing the world." Phenomenal objects participate in Ideas, and thus in some sense picture the world of reason. Ideas are noumenal entities corresponding to types or classes of phenomenal existencies. The idea of the Beautiful, for example, Plato terms the Beautiful *per se*, in distinction from beautiful objects, and says it is not simply a conception, but exists as a substance of and by itself; and all beautiful objects participate in it.

But all of Plato's philosophy has an ethical character and a practical purpose as might be expected of a disciple of Socrates. This is seen in his conception of the Idea of the Good as the highest of all, instead of the Idea of Being; but the former may be thought quite as universal as the latter, since every truly existent object is necessarily good. He views perfect Wisdom as identical with perfect Goodness, which is God, and makes the highest good for man—the *summum bonum*—the supreme end of life,—consist in the greatest possible likeness to God. And this likeness "is affected by that yearning after the ideal which we know by the name of Love." God is thus the absolutely good and the cause and end of all knowledge. "The possession of the good is happiness. Happiness depends on culture and justice or on the possession of moral beauty and goodness." In the *Philebus* Plato speaks of the Good as including measure, beauty, and symmetry as well as "mind," "pleasure," and "causality."

Virtue is the fitness of the soul for its proper duties. Justice is the universal virtue, and "perfect virtue arises when wisdom, courage and temperance, (the other three cardinal virtues), are bound together by justice." In the *Republic* he states "that the best and justest man is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable and that this is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his state."

It may be well to insert here a few words on the nature of the soul.

The soul is conceived by Plato to be threefold, the *immortal, divine, rational* part having its seat in the head, is united to the *mortal* part

consisting of two portions, the *courageous*, which is located in the heart, and the *appetitive* (desire), whose location is in the lower part of the trunk.

The indulgence of desires brings neither virtue nor happiness. They must be restrained to secure such a result. Pleasure results from the preservation of an inward harmony, pain from the lack of harmony.

The following additional statements of Plato's views are from Diogenes Laertius : "There are three classes of goods, viz. those of the mind, those of the body, and those that are wholly external. The four cardinal principles may be named as of the first class, health and strength of the second, friends and wealth of the third." "A perfectly happy man is one whose happiness consists of wisdom in counsel, a good condition of the sensations and health of body, good fortune, good reputation and riches." "There are evils corresponding to the goods and a third class which are neutral or indifferent." "On the subject of good and evil, these were his sentiments: that the end was to become like God; and that virtue was sufficient of herself for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as instruments to work with; such as health, strength, the integrity of the senses, and things of that kind; and also external advantages, such as riches, and noble birth, and glory. Still that the wise man would be not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances; for he would enjoy the constitution of his country, and would marry, and would not transgress the established laws, and that he would legislate for his country, as well as he could under existing circumstances, unless he saw affairs in an unmanageable condition, in consequence of the excessive factiousness of the people. . . . And he was the first person who defined the notion of the honorable, as that which borders on the praiseworthy, and the logical, and the useful, and the becoming, and the expedient, all which things are combined with that which is suitable to, and in accordance with, nature."

(e) THE ACADEMIES.

These are distinguished as the Old, Middle, and New or Reformed Academies, embracing five schools, viz: the Old, the first school; the Middle, the second and third schools; and the New, the fourth

and fifth schools. This is the distinction made by the later writers. Cicero recognized only the Old and the New Academy, the latter corresponding to what is here termed the Middle Academy, but including Philo. Antiochus himself claimed to be a true representative of the Old Academy. Zeller knows the school of Arcesilaus and Carneades as the New Academy. And thus Cicero may be classed, in so far as he accepts the doctrine of the Academy, as belonging either to the Middle, or to the New Academy.

(1) *The Old Academy.* See X. 30, Note.

Speusippus, Plato's nephew, was his uncle's successor at the head of the Academy. He was followed by Xenocrates, he by Polemo, and he by Crates. Other names are Heraclides of Pontus, Hermodorus and Crantor, to whose writings Cicero is indebted in his *Consolatio* and his *Tuscan Disputations*. Without treating of the special characteristics of individual views, it may be stated that in general the ethical theory of the Old Academy does not depart widely from that of Plato. While virtue is held to be the highest good it requires the addition of external goods to make life agreeable, that is, to produce a happy life. "Follow nature" was a precept of Xenocrates, Speusippus and Polemo, was the practice of the Cynics, and was adopted as a Stoic maxim but was not uniformly interpreted.

(2) *The Middle Academy.*

This was sceptical and is discussed by Zeller under the head of the Sceptics. The leading minds were Arcesilaus and Carneades, founders respectively of the second and third Academic schools. In respect to cognition they held that knowledge is not attainable and that probability is the utmost advance that can be made in the direction of knowledge. They professed to follow the example of Socrates, but complained that he approached too near to dogmatism when he said that he *knew* that he knew nothing. Carneades held that probability is of several degrees. "The lowest degree of probability arises when a notion produces by itself an impression of truth, without being taken in connection with other notions. The next higher degree is when that impression is confirmed by the agreement of all notions which are related to it. The third and

highest degree is when an investigation of all these notions results in producing the same corroboration for all. In the first case a notion is called probable; in the second probable and undisputed; in the third, probable, undisputed and tested." His ethical views were tinctured by his scepticism. To understand his position one should first note carefully the Stoic views which he combats. He could not "allow scientific certainty to any of the various opinions respecting the nature and aim of moral action; and in this point he attacked the Stoicks with steady home-thrusts. Their inconsistency in calling the choice of what is natural the highest business of morality, and yet not allowing to that which is according to nature a place among goods, was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater is said to have been brought to admit that not the objects to which choice is directed, but the actual choice itself is a good."

"The real meaning of Carneades can only be that virtue consists in an activity directed towards the possession of what is according to nature, and hence that it cannot as the highest Good be separated from accordance with nature. For the same reason, virtue supplies all that is requisite for happiness."

(3) *The New Academy.*

This was an eclectic school and notes a return to dogmatism. Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon, his pupil, to both of whom Cicero had listened, were the founders respectively of the fourth and fifth schools. Both revert to Plato and hold that truth is attainable. Antiochus endeavored to show that the principal doctrines of the Stoicks are to be found in Plato and that there is essential agreement between these and Aristotle as well.

Ethics. "Starting with the Stoic *prima naturae*, but enlarging their scope so as to take in not only all that belongs to self-preservation, but the rudiments of virtue and knowledge also, and defining the *Summum Bonum* as a life in accordance with the perfect nature of man, Antiochus includes under this, not only the perfection of reason, but all bodily and external good. Virtue in itself suffices for happiness, as the Stoicks said, but not for the highest happiness; here we must borrow a little from the Peripatetics; though they err in allowing too much weight to external goods, as the Stoicks err in the opposite direction."

(f) ARISTOTLE. SEE X. 30, NOTE.

Our purpose requires only a brief settlement of Aristotle's ethical views. He rejects Plato's idea of the absolute Good—the cause of all existence and all knowledge—and says, "If there is any one good, universal and generic, or transcendental and absolute, it obviously never can be realized nor possessed by man; whereas something of this latter kind is what we are inquiring after." What he seeks to know is what is good *for man*. Now the chief good is identical with "the final and perfect end of all action." The peculiar work or end of man is *rational activity*, because man is a rational creature, and such activity is in harmony with his nature.

Virtue is not exactly knowledge or science as Socrates taught, it is rather an art and is to be attained by exercise. So man attains good not through knowledge, but through exercise and *habit*. Aristotle means by habit a fixed and definite power or tendency of the soul, a natural instinct, not simply a mode of action. Men realize the good through nature, reason and habit; for we must *practice* moral acts in order to be virtuous as the musician practices music in order to become skilled.

The end of the activity of man,—which is his highest good, the realization of the soul's peculiar excellence,—is happiness, which depends on the continuous virtuous and rational activity of the soul. "Happiness is a perfect practical activity in a perfect life." But complete happiness cannot result from virtue alone; it requires besides the goods of the soul, the goods of the body, as health, strength, etc., external goods, as wealth, friends, etc.; and pleasures as well. Vice, however, is sufficient to cause unhappiness even if bodily and external goods are present in the highest degree.

Pleasure is the blossom and natural culmination of activity. To determine the moral quality of pleasure the perfect man must be the standard. That is true pleasure which is pleasure to him. All virtues are either intellectual, resulting chiefly from instruction, or ethical resulting from habit. The former refers to the reason rightly developing its own activities, and consists of reason, science, art and practical intelligence. The ethical virtues refer to the subjection of the lower functions to reason, and are courage, temperance, liberality and magnificence, high-mindedness and love of honor,

mildness, truthfulness, urbanity and friendship and justice. "Justice is the most perfect virtue because it is the perfect exercise of all virtue." The function of the reason in connection with the desires is to determine the *mean*, *i. e.*, the right proportion. For example, courage is a mean between fearing and daring, temperance between pleasures and pains, etc.

We may now give Aristotle's definition of virtue: "Virtue is habit characterized by deliberate choice, in the mean relative to ourselves, which is fixed or determined by reason and as the prudent man would determine it." He defines "deliberative choice" as "calculating choice exercised in regard to things contingent and within our power to do;" and prudence involved in the expression "the prudent man," as "moral insight and tendency to right action that are begotten of experience in acting justly, temperately," etc.

(g) THE PERIPATETICS.

Some of the most eminent followers of Aristotle were *Theophrastus* of Lesbos, *Eudemus* of Rhodes, *Aristoxenus the Musician*, and *Dicaearchus*. We may name also as later Peripatetics *Aristo*, *Hieronymus*, *Critolaus*, *Diodorus*, *Callipho*. See notes ix. 24 and 25. *Theophrastus* was, for the most part, faithful to the teachings of his master, giving his theories, however, a naturalistic interpretation. In ethics he taught that external goods are essential to perfect happiness and to the cultivation of virtue. The Stoics often reproached him with approving the poetic maxim, *vitam regit fortuna non sapientia*; See ix. 25; but he probably applied this only to man's external life. He thought that virtue is worthy to be sought on its own account, and that in its absence external goods are valueless; also that one is permitted and even required to deviate slightly from the rules of morals, when such deviation results in securing a great good to a friend or warding off from him a great evil. For the views *Aristoxenus* see i. x. 20; of *Dicaearchus* i. x. 21; xxxi. 77.

(h) THE STOICS. See XII. 34.

The founder of the school was *Zeno of Citium*. He was succeeded by *Cleanthes* and he by *Chrysippus*, who is regarded as the second founder of the school. Other Stoics were *Aristo* of Chios, *Diogenes the Babylonian*, *Antipater* of Tarsus, *Panaetius* of Rhodes, who was

the principal teacher of the doctrines at Rome, *Posidonius* of Rhodes, a teacher of Cicero, *Seneca* the younger, and the Emperor *Marcus Aurelius*. The Stoics introduced little if anything that was new into philosophy, their Logic being a modification of that of Aristotle, their Physics Heraclitean and their Ethics the Cynic Ethics elevated. They regarded themselves as followers of Socrates.

In presenting the chief ethical views of the school it will be best to quote from Zeller even at the expense of space. "The enquiry into the destiny and end of man turns with the Stoics, as it did with all moral philosophers since the time of Socrates, about the fundamental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary to make up the highest good or happiness. Happiness, they consider, can only be sought in rational activity or virtue. Speaking more explicitly, the primary impulse of every being is towards self-preservation and self-gratification. It follows that every being pursues those things which are most suited to its nature, and that such things only have for it a value. Hence the highest good—the end-in-chief, or happiness—can only be found in what is conformable to nature. Nothing can be conformable to nature for any individual thing, unless it be in harmony with the law of the universe, or with the universal reason of the world; nor, in the case of a conscious and reasonable being, unless it proceeds from a recognition of this general law—in short, from rational intelligence. In every enquiry into what is conformable to nature, all turns upon agreement with the essential constitution of the being, and this essential constitution consists, in the case of a man, simply in reason."....

"In every case the meaning is that the life of the individual approximates to or falls short of the goal of happiness, exactly in proportion as it approaches to or departs from the universal law of the world and the particular rational nature of man. In a word, a rational life, an agreement with the general course of the world, constitutes virtue. The principle of the Stoic morality might therefore be briefly expressed in the sentence: Only virtue is good, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue."...."A view of life is here presented to us in which happiness coincides with virtue, the good and the useful with duty and reason. There is neither any good independently of virtue, nor is there in virtue and for virtue any evil."

The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction

sanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of philosophers, between various kinds and degrees of good ; nor would they allow bodily advantages and external circumstances to be included among good things, together with mental and moral qualities. A certain difference between goods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds are mentioned by them in their formal division of goods. But these differences amount, in the end, to no more than this, that whilst some goods are good and useful in themselves, others are only subsidiary to them. The existence of several equally primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at variance with the conception of the good. That only is a good, according to their view, which has an unconditional value. That which has a value only in comparison with something else, or as leading to something else, does not deserve to be called a good. The difference between what is good and what is not good is not only a difference of degree, but also one of kind ; and what is not a good *per se* can never be a good under any circumstances. The same remarks apply to evil. That which is not in itself an evil can never become so from its relation to something else. Hence only that which is absolutely good, or virtue, can be considered a good ; and only that which is absolutely bad, or vice, can be considered an evil. All other things, however great their influence may be on our state, belong to a class of things neither good nor evil, but indifferent. Neither health, nor riches, nor honor, nor even life itself, is a good ; and just as little are the opposite states—poverty, sickness, disgrace and death—evils. Both are in themselves indifferent, a material which may either be employed for good or else for evil.

The Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked by the Stoics for including among goods external things which are dependent on chance. For how can that be a good under any circumstances, which bears no relation to man's moral nature, and is even frequently obtained at the cost of morality ? If virtue renders a man happy, it must render him perfectly happy in himself, since no one can be happy who is not happy altogether. Were anything which is not in man's power allowed to influence his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of virtue, and man would never be able to attain to that imperturbable serenity of mind without which no happiness is conceivable.

Least of all can pleasure be considered a good, or be regarded, as it was by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who places pleasure on the throne makes a slave of virtue; he who considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and the peculiar value of virtue; he appeals to feelings, rather than to actions; he requires reasonable creatures to pursue what is unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments of the lower animals. Pleasure must never be the object of pursuit, not even in the sense that true pleasure is invariably involved in virtue. That it no doubt is."...."The only point on which the Stoicks are not unanimous is whether every pleasure is contrary to nature, as the stern Cleanthes, in the spirit of Cynicism, asserted, or whether there is such a thing as a natural and desirable pleasure. Virtue, on the other hand, needs no extraneous additions, but contains in itself all the conditions of happiness."...."And so unconditional is this self-sufficiency of virtue, that the happiness which it affords is not increased by length of time. Rational self-control is here recognized as the only good; thereby man makes himself independent of all external circumstances, absolutely free, and inwardly satisfied.

The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a very marked feature in Stoicism—is thus more negative than positive. It consists in independence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment which moral conduct brings with it."

The cardinal virtues are four in number, viz.: practical wisdom, courage, temperance and justice, and represent the principal aspects of the one *honestum* or *decorum*. Man must overcome his emotions or passions (*perturbationes*) in order to be virtuous. "The Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with nature, was flatly denied by the Stoicks." Emotions are impulses that overstep natural limits, "disturbances of mental health." Hence a Stoic demands their entire suppression, and only then can virtue exist. The principal emotions are pleasure and pain, hope and fear. The first two are false beliefs of present good or evil, the last false beliefs of future good or evil.

"The teaching of Plato and Aristotle, requiring emotions to be regulated, but not uprooted, was attacked in the most vigorous manner by these philosophers. A moderate evil, they say, always

remains an evil. What is faulty and opposed to reason, ought never to be tolerated not even in the smallest degree." The wise man must have no emotion. "Pain he may feel, but, not regarding it as an evil, he will suffer no affliction, and know no fear. He may be slandered and ill-treated, but he cannot be injured or degraded. Being untouched by honor and dishonor he has no vanity. To anger he never yields, nor needs this irrational impulse, not even for valor and the championship of right. But he also feels no pity, and exercises no indulgence."

"Virtue contains in itself two elements—one practical the other speculative. At the root, and as a condition of all rational conduct, lies, according to the Stoics, right knowledge. On this point they are at one with the well-known Socratic doctrine, and with the teachings of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural virtue, or virtue acquired only by exercise they reject altogether. After the manner of Socrates, they define virtue as knowledge, vice as ignorance, and insist on the necessity of learning virtue. Even the avowed enemy of all speculative inquiry, Aristo of Chios, was on this point at one with the rest of the school.

However closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is based on knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, they are not content with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above practical activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. As we have seen already, knowledge with them was only a means towards rational conduct."

"From what has been said, it follows that there can be but one thoroughgoing moral distinction for all mankind, the distinction between the virtuous and the vicious; and that within each of these classes there can be no difference in degree. He who possesses virtue possesses it whole and entire; he who lacks it lacks it altogether; and whether he is near or far from possessing it is a matter of no moment."...."The whole of mankind are thus divided by the Stoics into two classes—those who are wise and those who are foolish; and these two classes are treated by them as mutually exclusive, each one being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly, among the foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible. The wise man is absolutely free from faults and mistakes : all that he does is right ; in him all virtues center; he has a right opinion on every

subject and never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever what is merely an opinion. The bad man, on the contrary, can do nothing aright ; he has every kind of vice ; he has no right knowledge, and is altogether rude, violent, cruel and ungrateful."...."The wise man only is free, because he only uses his will to control himself ; he only is beautiful, because only virtue is beautiful and attractive ; he only is rich and happy, because goods of the soul are the most valuable, true riches consisting in being independent of wants. Nay more, he is absolutely rich, since he who has a right view of everything has everything in his intellectual treasury, and he who makes the right use of everything bears to everything the relation of owner. The wise only know how to obey, and they also only know how to govern ; they only are therefore kings, generals, pilots ; they only are orators, poets and prophets ; and since their view of the Gods and their worship of the Gods is the true one, only amongst them can true piety be found—they are the only priests and friends of heaven ; all foolish men, on the contrary, are impious, profane and enemies of the Gods. Only the wise man is capable of feeling gratitude, love and friendship, he only is capable of receiving a benefit, nothing being of use or advantage to the foolish man. To sum up, the wise man is absolutely perfect, absolutely free from passion and want, absolutely happy ; as the Stoics conclusively assert, he in no way falls short of the happiness of Zeus, since time, the only point in which he differs from Zeus, does not augment happiness at all. On the other hand, the foolish man is altogether foolish, unhappy and perverse ; or, in the expressive language of the Stoics, every foolish man is a madman, he being a madman who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most closely affects him."

While the Stoics did not agree with Aristotle that anything is to be added to virtue to constitute happiness or the highest good, they did make a distinction respecting goods. All things are good, bad or indifferent. The bad are the opposite of the virtues, as folly, intemperance, cowardice, injustice ; all others are indifferent. Among these last some are to be preferred as having comparative value, and were termed *producta* or *praeposita*, viz., such as the primary objects of our natural instincts (*prima naturae*), as health, position, wealth ; their opposites being *reiecta*. A similar distinc-

tion is made between actions. As life belongs to the class of things indifferent suicide is permissible as a means of terminating it.

"Thus the Stoics worked out on ideal and absolute lines the thought of righteousness as the chief and only good. Across this ideal picture were continually being drawn by opponents without or inquirers within clouds of difficulty drawn from real experience. 'What,' it was asked, 'of *progress* in goodness? Is this a middle state between good and evil; or if a middle state between good and evil be a contradiction in terms, how may we characterize it?' Here the wiser teachers had to be content to answer that it *tended* towards good, was good in possibility, would be absolutely good when the full attainment came, and the straining after right had been swallowed up in the perfect calm of settled virtue.

'How also of the wise man tormented by pain, or in hunger and poverty and rags, is his perfectness of wisdom and goodness really sufficient to make him happy?' Here, again, the answer had to be hesitating and provisional, through no fault of the Stoics. In this world, while we are still under the strange dominion of time and circumstance, the ideal can never wholly fit the real. There must still be difficulty and incompleteness here, only to be solved and perfected 'when iniquity shall have an end.' Our eyes may fail with looking upward yet the upward look is well; and the jibes upon the Stoic 'king in rags' that Horace and others were so fond of, do not affect the question. It may have been, and probably often was, the case that Stoic teachers were apt to transfer to themselves personally the ideal attributes which they justly assigned to the ideal man in whom wisdom was perfected. The doctrine gave much scope for cant and mental pride and hypocrisy, as every ideal doctrine does, including the Christian." *Marshall.*

"The doctrine, of course, like every doctrine worth anything, was pushed to extravagant lengths, and thrust into inappropriate quarters, by foolish doctrinaires. As that the wise man is the only orator, critic, poet, physician, nay, cobbler if you please; that the wise man knows all that is to be known, and can do everything that is worth doing, and so on. The school was often too academic, too abstract, too fond of hearing itself talk. This, alas! is what most schools are, and most schoolmasters." *Id.*

(i) THE EPICUREANS. SEE IX. 26, NOTE.

EPICURUS who gave his name to the school of his founding came from Samos to Athens at an early age, and his school dates from about the year 306 B. C. He freely criticised other philosophers, among them Aristotle, and even Democritus, many of whose views he borrowed. He was greatly beloved by his disciples, and his word was law to them. The Epicurean school continued to the fourth century after Christ, outliving most other systems. Among his scholars may be named *Metrodorus* and *Hermarchus* who succeeded Epicurus as the head of the school. Other Epicureans were *Apollodorus*, *Zeno* of Sidon, *Phaedrus* contemporary with Cicero, and *Philodemus*; and at Rome, *Lucretius*, *Cassius* the conspirator, *Atticus* and others. While Epicurus, in the main, accepts the teaching of Democritus in Physics, in his Ethics, which is the feature of greatest importance for him, he follows Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, as Zeno followed Antisthenes. He turns away therefore from Plato and Aristotle and goes back to Socrates and the Socratic school.

Ethics. "The only unconditional good, according to Epicurus is pleasure; the only unconditional evil is pain. No proof of this proposition seemed to him to be necessary; it rests on a conviction supplied by nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our doing and not doing. If proof, however, were required, he appealed to the fact that all living beings from the first moment of their existence pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and that consequently pleasure is a natural good, and the normal condition of every being. Hence follows the proposition to which Epicurus in common with all the philosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of life.

At the same time, this proposition was restricted in the Epicurean system by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure nor pain is a simple thing. There are many varieties and degrees of pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has to be secured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in which pain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully weighed, and in consideration of the advantages and disadvantages which they confer,

would under circumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as a good. He would have pleasure forsaken if it would entail a greater corresponding pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the prospect of greater pleasure. He also agrees with Plato in holding that every positive pleasure presupposes a want, *i. e.*, a pain which it proposes to remove; and hence he concludes that the real aim and object of all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain, and that the good is nothing else but emancipation from evil. By a Cyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle motion of the soul or positive pleasure was proposed as the object of life; and hence happiness was not made to depend on man's general state of mind, but on the sum total of his actual enjoyments. But Epicurus, advancing beyond this position, recognized both the positive and the negative side of pleasures, both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as motion. Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the same footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and immediate cause of happiness is repose of mind. Positive pleasure is only an indirect cause of repose of mind in that it removes the pain of unsatisfied craving. This mental repose, however, depends essentially on the character of a man's mind, just as conversely positive pleasure in systems so materialistic must depend on sensuous attractions. It was consistent, therefore, on the part of Aristippus to consider bodily gratification the highest pleasure; and conversely Epicurus was no less consistent in subordinating it to gratification of mind.

In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says Epicurus, we do not mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor indeed sensual enjoyments at all, but the freedom of the body from pain, and the freedom of the soul from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the lawful nor unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the joys of the table, make life happy, but a sober judgment, investigating the motives for action and for inaction, and dispelling those greatest enemies of our peace, prejudices. The root from which it springs, and, therefore, the highest good, is intelligence. It is intelligence that leaves us free to acquire possession thereof, without being ever too early or too late. Our indispensable wants are simple, little being necessary to insure freedom from pain; other things only afford change in enjoyment, by which the quantity is not in-

creased, or else they rest on a mere sentiment. The little we need may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our happiness, would we only receive her gifts thankfully, not forgetting what she gives in thinking what we desire. He who lives according to nature is never poor ; the wise man living on bread and water has no reason to envy Zeus ; chance has little hold on him ; with him judgment is everything, and if that be right, he need trouble himself but little about external mishaps. Not even bodily pain appeared to Epicurus so irresistible as to be able to cloud the wise man's happiness. Although he regards as unnatural the Stoic's insensibility to pain, still he is of opinion that the wise man may be happy on the rack, and can smile at pains the most violent, exclaiming in the midst of torture, How sweet! [Cf. xxvi. 73]. A touch of forced sentiment may be discerned in the last expression, and a trace of self-satisfied exaggeration is manifest even in the beautiful language of the dying philosopher on the pains of disease. Nevertheless, the principle involved is based in the spirit of the Epicurean philosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the founder. The main thing according to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the state of the mind ; bodily pleasure being of short duration, and having much about it to unsettle ; mental enjoyments only being pure and incorruptible. For the same reasons mental sufferings are more severe than those of the body, since the body only suffers from present ills, whilst the soul feels those past and those to come. In a life of limited duration the pleasures of the flesh never attain their consummation. Mind only, by consoling us for the limited nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not standing in need of unlimited duration.

At the same time, the Epicureans, if consistent with their principles, could not deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his favorite pupil Metrodorus shrank from making this admission ; Epicurus declaring that he could form no conception of the good apart from enjoyments of the senses ; Metrodorus asserting that everything good has reference to the belly. For all that the Epicureans did not feel themselves driven to give up the pre-eminence which they claimed for goods of the soul over those of the body.” *Zeller.*

Virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness from virtue. Virtue should not be sought for its own sake.

"Virtue has only a conditional value as a means to happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed, virtue taken by itself does not render a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the exercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in the consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of virtuous action, but in the freedom from disquiet, fear and dangers, which follows as a consequence from virtue.

Wisdom and intelligence contribute to happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and of death, by making us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by pointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life. Self-control aids in that it points out the attitude to be assumed towards pleasure and pain, so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment and the minimum of suffering; valor in that it enables us to overcome fear and pain; justice in that it makes life possible without the fear of Gods and men, which ever haunts the transgressor. To the Epicurean virtue is never an end in itself, but only a means to an end lying beyond—a happy life—but withal a means so certain and necessary that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness nor happiness without virtue. However unnecessary it may seem, still Epicurus would ever insist that an action to be right must be done not according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not simply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in what is good.

The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his wise man as the Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only does he attribute to him a control over pain, in nothing inferior to the Stoic insensibility of feeling, but he endeavors himself to describe the wise man's life as most perfect and satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from emotions, and in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of the soul such as compassion, the wise man finds his philosophic activity in no wise thereby impaired. Without despising enjoyment, he is altogether master of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by intelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful influence on life.

He alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction; he alone knows how to do the right thing in the right way; he alone, as Metrodorus observes, knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is so far exalted above ordinary men, that Epicurus promises his pupils that, by carefully observing his teaching, they will dwell as Gods among men; so little can destiny influence him, that he calls him happy under all circumstances. Happiness may, indeed, depend on certain external conditions; it may even be allowed that the disposition to happiness is not found in every nature nor in every person; but still, when it is found, its stability is sure, nor can time affect its duration." *Id.*

The wise man may resort to suicide if necessary, but such cases of necessity are of very rare occurrence. Epicurus did not favor the Stoic view of suicide. He laid great stress on friendship, which, however, was based on motives of utility. He even calls it the highest of earthly goods. "The Epicurean friendship is hardly less celebrated than the Pythagorean."

"In spite of much that may offend in the doctrines of Epicurus there is much at least in the man which is sympathetic and attractive. What one observes, however, when we compare such a philosophy with that of Plato or Aristotle, is first a total loss of constructive imagination. The parts of the 'philosophy,' if we are so to call it, of Epicurus hang badly together, and neither the *Canonics* nor the *Physics* show any real faculty of serious thinking at all. The *Ethics* has a wider scope and a more real relation to experience if not to reason. But it can never satisfy the deeper apprehension of mankind." *Marshall.*

(j) RELATIONS OF EPICUREANISM TO STOICISM.

"The arena of the warmest dispute between the two schools is ethics. Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than appears at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than that between the Epicurean theory of pleasure and the Stoic theory of virtue; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same end—the happiness of mankind—but the conditions of happiness are also laid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue, according to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good;

but the former in making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal from the senses or insensibility; the latter in seeking pleasure in repose of mind or imperturbability, are expressing the same belief. Man can only find unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when by means of knowledge he attains to a condition of mind at rest with itself, and also to an independence of external attractions and misfortunes. The same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of both systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form—that of the ideal wise man—for the most part with the same features. The wise man of Epicurus is, as we have seen, superior to pain and want; he enjoys an excellence which cannot be lost; and he lives among men a very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into details, the difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and the Epicureans seems to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate happiness from virtue, nor the Epicureans separate virtue from happiness."

"The point of difference between the two schools is their view of the conditions under which certainty of consciousness is attained. The Stoics have to attain it by the entire subordination of the individual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are of opinion that man can only then be content in himself when he is restrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of happiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence on others and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make virtue, the latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived as of a purely negative character, as being freedom from pain, and is referred to the whole of human life. Hence it is always made to depend on the moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, and the state of the senses, on intelligence and actions conformable with intelligence, in short, on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the Epicureans arrive by a roundabout course at the same result as the Stoics—the conviction that happiness can only be the lot of those who are altogether independent of external things, and enjoy perfect inward harmony." *Zeller.*

(k) THE ECLECTICS.

"When criticism had demonstrated the presence of untenable elements in all the great systems, the ineradicable need of philosophical convictions could not but lead either to the construction of new systems or to Eclecticism....Eclecticism would naturally find acceptance with those who sought in philosophy not knowledge as such, but rather a general theoretical preparation for practical life and the basis of rational convictions in religion and morals, and for whom, therefore, rigid unity and systematic connection in philosophical thought were not unconditionally necessary. Hence the philosophy of the Romans was almost universally eclectic, even in the case of those who professed their adhesion to some one of the Hellenic systems. The special representative of Eclecticism is Cicero."

"M. Tullius Cicero (Jan. 3d, 106—Dec. 7th, 43 B. C.) pursued his philosophical studies especially at Athens and Rhodes. In his youth he heard first, Phaedrus the Epicurean and Philo the Academic, and was also instructed by Diodotus, the Stoic (who was afterwards, with Tyrannio, an inmate of his house. *Tusc.* V. 39). He afterward heard Antiochus of Askalon, the Academic, Zeno the Epicurean, and lastly (at Rhodes) Posidonius the Stoic. In his latter years Cicero turned his attention again to philosophy, especially during the last three years of his life. *Tusc.* V. 2.....Cicero defines the *morally good* (*honestum*) as that which is intrinsically praiseworthy, in accordance with the etymology of the word, which to him, the Roman, represents the Greek *xuiov*. The most important problem in ethics with him is the question whether virtue is alone sufficient to secure happiness. He is inclined to answer this question, with the Stoics in the affirmative, though the recollection of his own weakness and of the general frailty of mankind often fills him with doubts ; but then he reproaches himself for judging of the power of virtue, not by its nature, but by our effeminacy. Cicero is not altogether disinclined to the distinction made by Antiochus of Askalon between the *vita beata*, which is made sure under all circumstances by virtue, and the *vita beatissima*, to which external goods are necessary, although he entertains ethical and logical scruples respecting it, and elsewhere (*Tusc.* V. 13) rejects it ; but he contents himself with the thought that all which is not

virtue, whether it deserves the name of a good or not, is at all events vastly inferior to virtue in worth, and is of vanishing consequence in comparison with it. From this point of view the difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines sinks, in his view, to a mere difference of words, which Carneades had already declared it to be. Cicero is more decided in opposing the Peripatetic doctrine, that virtue requires the reduction of the $\pi\acute{a}\theta\eta$ (translated by Cicero *perturbationes*) to their right proportions; he demands with the Stoics, that the sage should be without $\pi\acute{a}\theta\eta$." Ucb.

In defining Cicero's ethical views we may quote further from Zeller. "The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a very marked feature in Stoicism—is thus more negative than positive. It consists in independence and peace of mind rather than in the enjoyment which moral conduct brings with it. In mental disquietude—says Cicero, speaking as a Stoic—consists misery ; in composure, happiness. How can he be deficient in happiness, he inquires, whom courage preserves from care and fear, and self-control guards from passionate pleasure and desire? How can he fail to be absolutely happy who is in no way dependent on fortune, but simply and solely on himself?"

N O T E S.

I. 1. **Quintus hic dies, Brute, finem faciet Tusculanarum disputationum:** See INTRODUCTION, I. **Brute.** M. Junius Brutus, one of the assassins of Julius Caesar. Quintilian says that Brutus was more distinguished as a philosopher than as an orator. And Cicero tells us in De Finibus, that Brutus had sent him (*i. e.*, dedicated to him) a treatise De Virtute. See *ex eo libro*, below. Like Cicero he was an eclectic, but was a disciple of the Old Academy save in ethics, in which he agreed, for the most part, with the Stoics. Cf. viii. 21, *putat*, and note.

Quem ad me accuratissime scripsisti, = quem accuratissime scriptum ad me misisti. Exact meaning of *accuratissime*? **ex multis sermonibus tuis,** from many of your conversations. **tormenta, strokes, blows.** **quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur:** Cf. VII. 19. *Cave enim putes ullam a philosophia vocem emissam clariorem ullum esse philosophie promissum uberior aut maius.*

2. **ea causa....ut conlocarent:** the *ut* clause is in apposition with *ea causa* and more fully defines the motive. It is a purpose clause. **qui primi:** As a matter of fact Socrates was the first to apply philosophy to life. **virtus, that is, the conception or idea of virtue.** **subiecta sub....casus:** Cf. X. 29, *neque ulla alia huic verbo....subiecta notio*, where dat. follows the participle.

Sin autem....videantur, (freely), if virtue does not rise superior to fortune and is incapable of always maintaining itself, I fear that we shall lose confidence in the power of virtue to conduct us to happiness, and resort to prayer for that condition.

Videantur belongs, of course, to the *tam* clause (*videatur*) as well as to the *quam* clause. Cf. 4. *illa....omnia....subter se habet*, etc.

Abbreviations: Grammars, A. Allen & Greenough; H. Harkness; R. Roby; Z. Zumpt.

T. Tischer (Sorof); D. Doederlein, Latin Synonymes; Ueb. Ueberweg; Zr. Zeller.

Cf. compare; s. v. sub verbo; sc. or scil. scilicet, namely.

3. **huic . . . sententiae**: as above, *praesidii ad beate vivendum in virtute satis est.* **extimescere**: note the meaning of the word. Cf. with *vereor*. See D. **Congruentis**, *sharing in, sympathizing with. implicatos, involved in, affected by.*

4. **Castigo**, *I correct.* **existimo=judico.** **avunculus tuus**: Cato Uticensis, the Stoic and the suicide. Brutus' mother, Servilia, was the half sister, and his wife Porcia, the daughter of Cato. **despiciens, contemnit**: *Despicimus infra nos posita, ut vulgi opiniones; contemnimus, magna, metuenda, ut pericula, mortem.* Lamb. *Despicere, not to value; contemnere, not to fear.* D.

venientia metu . . . maerore praesentia: Figure? A. 344 f, (2); H. 562.

II. 5. **Culpae . . . vitiorum peccatorumque**: *culpa*, guilt as the state of a responsible agent, however light the offense; *vitium*, either a censurable action or quality or a natural defect; *peccatum*, strictly an indiscreet transgression of the laws of nature and reason, but often having a broader meaning. We may render, *fault, offenses, transgressions.* **his gravissimis casibus**: Cicero, a sincere patriot, was tossed about in the conflict of the selfish, ambitious passions of his time, in the civil war, and was practically forced out of public life. The death of his daughter intensified his sorrow. **in eundem portum**: Cicero listened to philosophical lectures by Phaedrus, the Epicurean, and by Philo, of the New Academy, as early as 89 B. C. when only 17 years of age. In 79 B. C. he studied philosophy at Athens. Diodotus, the Stoic, resided many years in Cicero's house. Cf. XXXIX. 113. **sine te**: A. 310. a; H. 507. 3. Note 7. **tu dissipatos homines**, etc. The steps from barbarism to civilization are noted. The social instinct, under the guidance of philosophy and science (which were identical), leads to the construction of dwelling places (*domiciliis*), to regard for the marriage relation (*coniugiis*), to written language and oratory (*litterarum et vocum*), to civil (*legum*) and moral (*morum*) laws, and to training (*disciplinae*). **peccanti immortalitati, an eternity of transgression.** Seneca says that one day of learning is worth the longest life of ignorance. **largita . . . es**: Cf. *dare*. See Lex. s. v.

6. **tantum abest ut . . . ut**: A. 332. d; H. 502. 3. **proinde ac . . . merita**, *as much as it has deserved.* **parricidio**: because of

parentem (parent, source of existence). before. **percipere**, sc. *eam philosophiam*; to appreciate.

III. 7. **Quam rem**, i. e. *philosophiam*. Cicero is speaking of the invention of the term φιλοσοφία (philosophia) to denote *sapientia*, the original Latin term. **initiorum**, first principles. **hoc pulcherrimum nomen**: *sapere* means to taste, then to have good taste, discernment, that is to be wise; whence *sapientia*. **adsequebatur**, acquired. **illos septem**: Bias, Chilo, Cleobulus, Pittacus, Periander, Solon, Thales. Excepting Thales these men were deemed wise statesmen rather than philosophers. **Saeculis**, generations. **Lycurgum**: the Spartan legislator; flourished about 825 B. C. He is said to have met Homer in Chios, or at least to have met with the Homeric poems which he introduced into Sparta. **Homerus** probably antedated *Lycurgus*. **habitos esse**, were regarded.

8. **Atlas**: son of Titan Iapetus, and brother of Prometheus, condemned to bear the heavens on head and hands. **Prometheus**: chained by Jove to Mt. Caucasus as a punishment. **Cepheus**: king of Ethiopia, together with his wife Cassiopeia, and daughter Andromeda, and her husband Perseus, were placed among the stars (*stellatus*; See Lex.). Read the story in the Mythology or Clas. Dict. The student should read Ovid's version and Kingsley's Andromeda. **caelestium**, heavenly bodies. **divina cognitio**.... **traduxisset**: i. e. their wisdom (*sapientia*) has been symbolically expressed by the ancients in the myth of their transformation. **in rerum contemplatione studia ponebant**: were devoting themselves to the study of the universe. Almost the entire sum of knowledge of the ancients is comprehended in this expression. It includes philosophy, science and theology. Lucretius entitles his work *De Rerum Natura*, following his master Epicurus and other philosophical writers among the Greeks who wrote Ἡσπὶ Φύσεως, on Nature,—of which the Latin is but a translation. **Pythagorae**: Pythagoras, born on the island of Samos about 580 B. C., migrated to Lower Italy and settled at Croton, 529 B. C.,—founded a religious brotherhood with a politico-philosophical character and is thought to have perished in the revolution it provoked. He left no writings, for the Golden Sayings—seventy-one maxims in hexameter—although attributed to him, are not genuine.

He is supposed to have travelled a great deal in his earlier life. Among other views he held the doctrine of the transmigration of souls (*metempsychosis*), and that number is the principle of the universe and of moral life. **Heraclides:** born 380 B. C. at *Heracles* in Pontus, surnamed *Ponticus*. He went to Athens and became a disciple of Plato and of Aristotle. **Phliuntem:** *Phlius* was the chief town of *Phliasia* in the northeastern part of the Peloponnesus. **eumque:** observe the change from the relative to the demonstrative in the same sentence. Cf. I. XLIV. 106, *Neque te* for *neque quam*. **arte:** *ars* primarily signifies skill in combining, (cf. *arma* and *artus*), and then handicraft, profession, *art*. **Philosophum:** Pythagoras is thus given the credit of coining this modest term—lover of wisdom. He said that the name *σοφός*, wise, used by the older sages, belongs only to deity. **quid:....interresset**, *what difference there is.*

9. **mercatum eum**, *that festival assemblage*. Mayor says, the Olympic games. Acc. instead of dat. with similem. **maximo....apparatu**, *the most splendid representation*. Abl. accompaniment. **celebritate**, *numerous concourse; manner*. **ut peterent**: etc. comparative clause of manner; subordinate in ind. discourse. **quaestu et lucro**: the terms are similar—the former signifying the steady gains of a regular occupation ; the latter, gains earned and deserved. **visendi....perspicerent**: Cf. I. XIX. 44 ; *visere, perspicendiisque*. The former is the intensive from *videre*, the latter passes over to the idea of mental vision, contemplation. **mercatus**: gen. **ex alia vita**: The doctrine of the transmigration of souls. **intuerenter, contemplate**. **spectare**, *to behold*, as a theatrical representation. **id est enim**, *for that is the meaning of*. **liberalissimum, the most noble occupation**; predicate for both *spectare* and *praestare*. **omnibus studiis=omnibus aliis studiis**. **in vita....praestare**: as the Greeks viewed it ; the Romans were intensely practical.

IV. 10. **rerum: i. e. philosophic doctrines. in Italiam**: to Croton. **quae magna dicta est**: Graecia Magna or Major was a name given, not to Southern Italy, but to districts there settled and inhabited by Greeks. Even Cumae and Neapolis were included. How the designation originated is unknown. **privatim et publiceinstitutis et artibus**: Chiasmus, for *privatim* belongs to *artibus (disciplina)*, *publice* to *institutis*. **ab antiqua philosophia**:

from Thales, Pythagoras, etc. **Socratem:** of Athens, 469-399 B. C. It would be difficult to overestimate his influence on philosophy. **Archelaum:** of Athens or Miletus. Flourished about 450 B. C. Said to have made an advance on his teacher, Anaxagoras, in moral speculation. Was surnamed *Physicus*. **Anaxagorae:** Anaxagoras, 500-428 B. C.—was a native of Clazomenae, but removed to Athens and gave philosophy a home in that city. He was the friend and teacher of Pericles and Euripides, and Socrates listened to his teaching. He assumed two principles—a material principle, a medley of an infinite number of “seeds” of things, and a spiritual principle—an independent intelligence operating on matter. Later philosophers termed his material elements or “seeds”, homoeomeria, *i. e.* particles of like kind with themselves and with the whole that is made up of them, thus differing from the atoms of Democritus which give rise to the different qualities of their compounds by the mode of composition. **numeri:** Cf. I. X. 20; XVII. 38, *nisi quid erat numeris aut descriptionibus expli-candum*. **et** before **cuncta caelestia**, and generally. The Pythagoreans speculated about the “five” planets and the fixed stars, and the Sophists included astronomy in their teachings. **Socrates.... primus:** etc. *i. e.* Socrates was the first moral philosopher, the first to direct his attention inward, to study man, to make practical application of the Delphic inscription “know thyself”. See INTRODUCTION. **e caelo:** *i. e.*, out of the sphere of the phenomena of nature.

II. **Platonis:** 429-348 B. C. The foremost philosopher of antiquity, disciple of Socrates and founder of the Academy. See INTRODUCTION. **memoria et litteris**, by the recorded reminiscences. Fig.? **consecrata, immortalized.** See Lex. s. v. II. C. **genera, sects or schools.** There may be mentioned the Cyrenaics, (Aristippus of Cyrene, founder); the Cynics, (Antisthenes, founder); the Megarians, (Euclides, of Megara, founder). These were called the Lesser Socratics. Then the Academy, (Plato,) and the later Academies, (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Carneades, Antiochus); the Peripatetics, (Aristotle, Theophrastus, etc.); the Stoics, (Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus). See INTRODUCTION. **id: sc. genus. ut....tegeremus** etc. A. 332. *f*; H. 501. III. **et....quaereremus;** A. 208. *b. 2.* See IV. VII. 16. **Carneades:** of Cyrene—214—129 B. C.—found-

er of the second school of the Middle Academy at Athens, industriously combated the Stoic doctrines, especially their Theology. His polemics against Stoic dogmatism was mainly negative, in harmony with the view that opinion is the utmost certainty in knowledge attainable. Carneades was one of the three Athenian ambassadors that came to Rome in 155 B. C. See INTRODUCTION. **in Tusculano:** at Cicero's Tusculan villa. **fecimus . . . ut disputaremus:** the circumlocution adds emphasis. A. 332. *e*; H. 498. II. Note 2. **eodem in loco:** *i. e.* in the so-called Academy, a promenade in Cicero's Tusculan Villa made to resemble the Academy at Athens—Plato's school. Cf. II. III. 9, *in Academiam descendimus. est propositum de quo disputaremus:* Cf. I. IV. 7, *Ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet; ad id aut sedens aut ambulans disputabam.*

V. 12. **videtur:** the sense is that of *censeo*. The personal construction is more common, as I. IV. 9, *Malum mihi videtur esse mors.* A. 330. *b*; H. 534, I. Note I. (I). **Bruto Meo:** with reference to his treatise *De Virtute*. Cf. V. I. 1. See also INTRODUCTION for the Stoic view of virtue. **quod mihi dixi videri, of which I have expressed an opinion.** **nempe:** in a question asking for a more precise statement; with **negas** we may render, *do you mean to deny?* Lex. s. v. II. 1. **quidni or quid ni:** used with the subjunctive in a rhetorical question. R. 1614. *cur non* expects an answer. **Nam etiam,** etc. He denies that all who live uprightly are happy; for a person could not be happy under torments however upright and courageous.

13. **eculeum, rack.** **adspirat, i. e. accedere temptat.** The Stoics distinguished between things in our power and things not in our power. Among the former are the affections, desires, opinions, etc., among the latter wealth, rank, etc. But we can train ourselves to regard the latter as unimportant, and, to that extent, they are in our power. The grand duty of life is to enthrone reason by which to control every impulse and every disturbing cause. By reason we must arrive at a condition of perfect indifference to pleasure and pain, hope and fear. The wise man has attained this ideal and is perfectly happy; but the wise man is the virtuous man—the terms are synonymous. Hence the reasoning of M. in the text, who maintains that virtue is sufficient for a happy life. **Haec etiam in**

eculeum....quo vita non aspirat *vita*; Simcox criticises the author's style in this expression as being affected by a reckless earnestness. He says:

"The discussion whether *vita beata* will mount the rack with the philosopher is a model of the careless personification which misses being picturesque and succeeds in being illogical; and it is one of the praises of Latin literature that it generally abstains from this slovenly sort of personification, and only personifies to make a direct and vivid appeal to the imagination."

si quid es facturus; *i. e.*, if you are to convince me or to effect anything in opposition to my views. **tamquam=sicut.** **nihil valent in aqua,** do not keep their strength when mixed with water. **velut,** as for instance: stating an example under a general proposition. **chorus virtutum:** so Horace, *chorus vatum scriptorum*, etc.

14. **hoc;** viz. *positne* etc. **nudum,** *unobscured.* **noli vereri,** have no fear. **Si enim nulla virtus prudentia vacat;** Chrysippus, the Stoic, held that the primitive virtues are prudence, manly courage, justice and temperance. Allophanes thought that there is but a single virtue, viz. prudence. The Stoics, generally, held that the "virtues reciprocally follow one another and that he who has one has all." *Diog. Laert. Life of Zeno.* In III. XVII, "What answer will you make to prudence, who informs you that she is a virtue sufficient of herself both to teach you a good life and also to secure you a happy one?" **M. Atilio (Regulo):** the hero of one of the most celebrated stories in Roman History. See Clas. Dict. **Q. Caepione;** *Q. Servilius Cacpio*, defeated on the Rhone (105 B. C.) by the Cimbri, cast into prison either for misconduct in this war or for sacrilege. **M. Aquilio;** Consul 101 B. C., defeated in 88 B. C. and imprisoned by Mithradates, who slew him by pouring molten gold down his throat. **ipsa prudentia:** repeated for the sake of clearness.

VI. 15. For the reasoning in this Chapter see philosophical note in paragraph 13.

Atqui introduces a fresh step in the reasoning. **profligata,** almost settled. **motus turbulenti:** etc. the emotions or passions—grief (or pain), desire (or hope), fear, pleasure. They were termed by the Stoics "perturbations," and occasion error in thought. The virtuous man must have right judgment and right intention. **vitae beatae;** Gen. *ignominiam*; through the *nota censoria*. See Dict.

Antiq. The power of the censors was very great. **infamiam, loss of political rights.** The *infamis* was expelled from his tribe and lost his vote and right to hold office. **non....sed;** this expression is not quite equivalent to *non modo....sed etiam*. The emphasis is here put on the latter expression, viz. *potentibus populis*. **quod....potentibus populis....contigit, servitutem;** is there an allusion to the supremacy of Caesar in these words? *contigit*, here of an unfortunate occurrence—like *accidit*.

16. **ægritudine:** sickness of both body and mind, but in philosophical language usually of the former. **eliditur;** as a ship dashed to pieces on the beach: *shattered*. **quo (que)....eo:** correlatives. **laetitia; exsultans; gestiens:** *laetitia* denotes joy as a calm and cheerful expression; *exsultans* denotes an extravagant outbreak of joy; *gestiens*, denotes a passionate uncontrollable expression of joy and triumph. **metus....aegritudines....libidines....laetitiae;** these are the four kinds (*genera*) of perturbations noted in paragraph 13, and again referred to in note on VI. 15. The *metus* (fear), and *aegritudo*, (grief, pain), arise from an opinion of evil impending (fear) or present (pain). The *laetitia* or *voluptas gestiens* (pleasure), arises from an opinion of present good, *libido* or *cupiditas* (desire, hope), from an opinion of future good. The virtuous man must get rid of all such beliefs and reach a state entirely emotionless and without perturbation of any kind. **languidis liquefaciunt voluptatibus, weakened by enervating pleasures.**

17. **ex quo=ut ex eo.** Cf. *ex hoc*, I. XII. 28. Note another statement, in varied terms, of the four passions as above; *timor, angor, concupiscat, voluptate.* See also first sentence of next chapter. **idemque si**, etc., the characteristic clause is discontinued; anacoluthon.

VII. A. admits both propositions (**alterum....alterum; the one....the other**), viz. that they who are subject to no “perturbations” are happy, and that the ideal wise man, who is included in this class, is happy. **quin=qui non**, a dependent question: R. 1768. **impotenti, uncontrollable. integrum non est, is not open for discussion. effectum est:** here used with an infinitive, but often with a consecutive clause.

18. **ad eam rem:** *i. e.* which they wish to demonstrate. **modo, only. scriptum est:** as in a text book. **in eam;** take with *conveniunt*.

Quodni ita esset.... si esset; a double condition, the tense of the latter being subject to the law of sequence. **si esset quaesitum satisne,** if the question under discussion were whether, etc. **honestum;** "The Greeks declare that the beautiful ($\tauὸ\; καλόν$) is good; Cicero declared that the honorable (*honestum*) [morally good] alone is good. Where, therefore, the Greeks had spoken of $\tauὸ\; καλὸν$, and we should speak of moral good, Cicero speaks of *honestum*, and finds precisely similar arguments on it. This conception implies, besides self-regarding rectitude the praise of others and the rewards of glory, and hence is eminently suited to the public spirited men for whom he wrote. To it is opposed the base (*turpe*), that disgraceful evil which all good men would avoid." *Cruttwell.* Cf. *de Officiis*, sive *honestum solum bonum est, ut Stoicis placet*, etc., whether *honestum* is the only good as the Stoics hold, etc. Also the following from the *Acad.* "Zeno placed everything which could have any effect in producing a happy life in virtue alone, and reckoned nothing else a good at all, and called that honorable (*honestum*) which was single in its nature and the sole and only good (*bonum*)."

The reasoning in **nihil bonum.... sit bonum**, is, that virtue is sufficient for a happy life because there is nothing good which is not at the same time honorable (morally good), and that the contrary is quite as true, viz. that nothing is good which is not honorable because virtue is sufficient for a happy life. The fuller process is seen in the next note. See also VIII. 21, *Ego enim*, etc. **ante docuisse:** i. e., in the various passages of his philosophical books—as the following from the *de Fin.*

"The conclusions of the Stoics are arrived at as follows: 'Everything which is good is praiseworthy; but everything which is praiseworthy is honorable';....and so the result is that whatever is good is also honorable (*honestum*). In the next place I ask, who can boast of a life which is miserable; or avoid boasting of one which is happy? Therefore men boast only of a life which is happy. From which the consequence follows that a happy life deserves to be boasted of; but this cannot properly be predicated of any life which is not an honorable one. From which it follows that a happy life must be an honorable one....And that man of lofty and excellent spirit—that magnanimous and truly brave man who considers all human accidents beneath his notice—ought to confide in himself, and in his own life both past and to come and to form a favorable judgment of himself, laying down as a principle, that no evil can happen to a wise man. From which again the same result follows, that the sole good is that which is honorable; and that to live happily is to live honorably, that is, virtuously."

The virtuous life implies honor which is identical with the highest good; a life of honor (thus defined, which is subject to no distractions) must be a happy life. The converse of which is equally true.

19. *Propriis....et suis*, peculiar and strictly their own. **clarior-em**, more noble i. e. than that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Cf. I. 1. *nihil est enim omnium....quod gravius magnificentiusque dicatur. paruisset*; representing fut. perf. time. **ut esset....armatus**: A. 287 e; II. 495, II.

20. *videro*; with the force of the future. Z. 511. **tantisper**, meanwhile. **Nam Xerxes**; etc. Contrasted with the happiness and contentment effected by virtue. This story is related of other Persian kings also. **praemiis**, advantages. The force of the preposition in the compound *praemium* is felt here. **qui invenisset**: the antecedent is often omitted especially when indefinite. **hoc firmius crederemus**: viz. that virtue of itself, unaided by pleasures, suffices for happiness.

VIII. 21. *habeo p. q. requiram*, I want a little information. **eorum**: The Stoics. Supply *iis*; Plural because both propositions are contained in *alterum....esse*. **ut quem ad modum**, foll. See VII. 18, *cui satis*, etc. **Sic**; scil. sequatur. *sic* is correlative with *quem ad modum*, *ut* introducing the result clause. **Brutus**. See I. 1. **Aristo**; *Aristus, of Ascalon*, an Academic philosopher of Athens, brother of Antiochus, at one time teacher and friend of Brutus and Cicero. **Antiocho**; *Antiochus of Ascalon*, a disciple of Philo, from whom he differed, attempted to combine the Stoic and Peripatetic systems with the Academic. He placed the goods and virtues of the body along with those of the soul, among the perfect goods and virtues. **putat**; sc. *vitam beatam virtute confici*.—Brutus held against the Stoics that external goods, and consequently evils, may exist and still virtue be sufficient for a happy life. The Stoics denied that if any one is in actual evil he could be happy; and so they restricted the terms *goods* and *evils* closely.

22. *quid cuique consentaneum*, etc. how these views are harmonized. **alio loco**; sc. *dicam*. **saepe**; In 79 B. C. he spent six months at Athens studying philosophy (under Antiochus), and rhetoric. **nuper**; from July, 51, for a year, he was proconsul of Cilicia, and was honored by the title of Imperator for his conduct in a campaign against the robber tribes of Mount Amanus. He

stopped at Athens on his return, B. C. 50. **videbatur**: the personal construction of the passive of *video* is the usual one; but in the next clause we have *sapientem....posse*, a new subject being introduced. **ulla corporis aut fortunae mala**: Cf. *infra*, 23, *tria genera malorum*, and XXX., 85, *Tr̄ia genera bonorum maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa (i. e. fortunae) tertia, ut Peripatetici nec multo veteres Academici secus.* The *bona* have their corresponding *mala*. The question that Cicero raises in the text is whether evils other than those of the mind are really *evils*. The Stoics held that external good and evil are matters of indifference, and apparent evils are often blessings. **neque tamen beatissimam**: Antiochus, like the Peripatetics, adds external goods to virtue, in order to produce the greatest happiness. **deinde ex maiore parte**: etc., that things generally get their names from that which predominates in their composition. **genere, non numero, by quality (or character), not by quantity**. **clauderet**: from *claudeo*. Cf. *claudico*.

23. **Nam et qui**: etc. It may be conceded that in some cases it is true that things are known from their predominant elements, but the principle is inapplicable to happiness. **et, quod, and, as to what**. Z. 626, 627; A. 333. a; H. 516. 2 N. **valeat**: characteristic. **tria genera malorum**: See note above. **qui**: the antecedent is *hūic urgeatur, oppressed*. **cum vero tria....beatissimam**: Cicero wishes to convict Antiochus of inconsistency (*non constans*), and reasons from A.'s point of view. A. holds that goods (*bona*) of body (*corporis*) and estate (*fortunae*) must be added to *virtus* to produce the highest happiness, although *virtus* alone can produce a less degree of happiness. Cicero reasons that, if that be true, the presence of *virtus* accompanied *not* by the other two classes of blessings, but by their opposites, or evils, must be fatal to *any* degree of happiness, to say nothing (*non modo*) of the highest degree.

IX. 24. **Hoc**; See last note. **Theophrastus**; 371--287 B. C. Born in Lesbos, lived at Athens; pupil of Plato, then of Aristotle whom he succeeded as the head of the Peripatetic School; somewhat independent in his views. He devoted himself especially to investigations in natural science, and was the founder of the science of Botany, as Aristotle was of that of Zoology. He advocated Aristotle's view that external goods are a necessary concomitant of virtue, and an essential to happiness. Cic. says of him that "he stripped

virtue of its beauty and made it powerless by denying that to live happily depended solely on it," *Acad.*; again, "And this point [whether happiness is wholly in the power of a wise man, or whether it can be undermined or taken from him by adversity], is the especial subject of the book of Theophrastus, on a Happy Life; in which a great deal is attributed to fortune; and if that theory is correct, then wisdom cannot make life happy." *de Fin.* **Sustinerne non potuit**, could not heartily maintain (*advocate*), although a Peripatetic, desiring to be consistent. Compare the views of Antiochus, as given in the preceding chapter, with those of Theophrastus, in the preceding note. **Nam cum statuisset....sentiret;** unlike Antiochus, he could hardly predicate *any* happiness under such circumstances. **Consequentia....prima**, conclusions....premises. **elegantissimus**=*subtilissimus*, most precise. **T. primum**; the corresponding sentence is *vexatur idem*, in the following paragraph (25). **in eo libro**, in respect to that book. **rotam**, wheel of torture. The bracketed words, found in some MSS. are supposed to be an ancient gloss.

25. **Cui concesserim**; equivalent to a condition. **dolores corporis....naufragia fortunae**; two of the three classes of evils. **huic succensere**; the answer implied is *no*, because he is consistent; Antiochus is not consistent. **Callisthene**: In his book on Callisthenes. The latter was his friend and fellow-pupil under the instruction of Aristotle. He was also a fellow-pupil and historian of Alexander the Great. He, however, refused to pay that monarch homage as to a divinity, and was by him thrown into prison, where he died in 328 B. C. at the age of 32. He was a relative of Aristotle. **Vitam regit fortuna non sapientia**: Theophrastus departed somewhat from Aristotle's ethical teachings. Aristotle (See INTRODUCTION) held that the highest happiness consists in activity of the reason, *i. e.* in philosophy; that somewhat of external prosperity, although very little, is needed for the putting forth of that activity which constitutes happiness; that virtue is habit characterized by deliberate choice which is determined by reason, and as the prudent man would determine it. Thus stress is laid on reason and wisdom as the condition of a happy life. Theophrastus seems to have made less of the transcendence of reason, and to have assigned much weight to fortune as an element of happiness.

The verse (Iambic Trimeter) is probably from Ennius' *Penthesilea*.
languidius, with less spirit. **in corpore**, depending on the body.

26. **Epicurum**: 342-268 B. C. Founder of the Epicurean school at Athens, which flourished there for more than 200 years, and much longer in other cities. Epicurus was born in the Attic deme of Gargettus, but his early life was passed at Samos. It was not until 304 B. C. that he came to Athens, where he gave his lectures in "the Garden" surrounded by his friends. His death occurred in 268 B. C. after very great sufferings, through which and to the last he maintained a calm mind and a serene spirit. In his Ethics he taught that happiness is the highest good—happiness found in pleasure—not the pleasure of the moment, (although Cicero often inclines so to interpret it), but the enduring condition of pleasure. In its essence this pleasure is freedom from pain,—the greatest of evils. But pleasure of mind is a greater good than the negative pleasure of freedom from bodily pains. Virtue contributes to this higher pleasure by regulating the appetites and passions and banishing fear. Virtue is, therefore, desirable, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure it thus secures. "Virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness from virtue." Zr. Wisdom is the cardinal virtue, enabling us to calculate the probable consequences of our actions in regard to pleasure or pain. If the judgment be right a man need trouble himself but little about external mishaps. **Antisthenes**: b. 444 B. C. Founder of the Cynic and indirectly of the Stoic schools,—pupil and friend of Socrates, carried to the extreme the ascetic views of his master. See INTRODUCTION. Antisthenes held that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and can be taught, and, after acquisition, cannot be lost; that the wise man is superior by reason of his self-sufficiency while the masses are fools and slaves. In conduct, their views had for their result shabbiness of dress, mendicancy, indecency of manner of life, etc. Antisthenes "wore no garment except a cloak," "renounced all diet except the simplest.... was stern and bitter in his language." Diogenes, his disciple, was a greater extremist than his teacher. **fortunam.... sapienti**: that fortune has very slight influence on the wise man **isne**: i. e. Epicurus. **cum dolorem.... sed solum malum dixerit**: Cicero, to be just, should, perhaps, include in *dolorem*, *pain of soul* as well as of *body*. Their *summum bonum* was the "freedom

of the body from pain and the soul from confusion." Still they held bodily pleasure to be the foundation of all other pleasures.

27. **Metrodorus**: d. 277 B. C. Disciple of Epicurus, and who sensualized his philosophy. He says, "All good is concerned with eating." See XXXVII. 109, note. **Occupavi**: *I have anticipated.* **adspirare**: See Lex. s. v. B. **Aristo**: of Chios, a Stoic and disciple of Zeno; flourished about 260 B. C. **Zeno**: a native of Cittium in Cyprus. Founder of the Stoic school. He was greatly honored by the Athenians. See INTRODUCTION. **spe**: that it will thus continue. **isto....bono**: *i. e. firma corporis affectio*, etc. **iam, instantly**.

X. 28. **istorum hominum**; Epicureans; contemptuous. **velut**: belongs to the illustration following, and not to the single sentence.

29. **cumulata, full, perfect. si mala illa ducimus**: The Stoics do not regard these as evils, and Cicero here holds the same view. They regarded as indifferent those things that are "neither beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, good reputation, nobility of birth, and their contraries, death, disease, labor, disgrace, weakness, poverty, and bad reputation, baseness of birth and the like." *Diog. Laert. Life of Zeno*. The bad are the vices—the opposite of the virtues; folly, intemperance, cowardice and injustice. **in his tot et tantis**: *malis* is purposely omitted because of the distinction pointed out in the last note. **praestare, to be responsible for the doctrine**.

30. **communibus magistris**; as Aristus and Antiochus. See VIII. 21, and note. **Aristotle**; See INTRODUCTION. Aristotle was born B. C. 384, at Stageira in Thrace. He was for many years a disciple of Plato, but afterward the head of an independent school. He developed opposition especially to Plato's theory of Ideas. For eight years prior to the founding of his school—the Lyceum—he was at the court of Philip, king of Macedonia, as the tutor of his son—afterward Alexander the Great. From his habit of walking up and down the shady avenues while conversing with his pupils on the problems of philosophy, his school received the name Peripatetic. He died in 322 B. C. See an interesting article in the *Century* magazine for July, 1892, on the discovery at Eretria of what the author and discoverer, Charles Waldstein, supposes to be the tomb

of Aristotle. Aristotle's writings are numerous,—both scientific and philosophic. He is regarded as the originator of Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric in its scientific aspect, Literary Criticism, Natural History, Physiology and Psychology. He first treated of the History of Philosophy, and of the forms of government existing at that time. His was one of the greatest intellects the world has known. **Speusippus:** See INTRODUCTION. *Speusippus*, the son of Plato's sister,—succeeded his uncle as the head of the Academy and was himself succeeded by *Xenocrates*—396–314, B. C.—and he in turn by *Polmo*, d. 273 B. C. **titulus hic ; sc. sapientis. inducant animum, let them determine.** *So mögen sie sich entschliessen.* T. **se neque fortunae....ducant in bonis;** a succinct statement of Stoic doctrine. **neque (nec)....-que :** This combination occurs only occasionally. Z. 338. The *-que*, from its nature (Z. 333), has here an adversative force. **sibi ;** This word is necessary for limiting the *omnia*, and with it = *omnia sua, all so far as it is of interest to them.*

31. **Nunc, now, however; under these circumstances. quaeviri and quae volgus** are contrasted. **qua gloria=cuius rei gloria ; i. e. sapientis. si dis placet, please the gods, or, with God's help.** Ironically used. **si ipse se audiret, if he would be consistent.** **Quam hoc suave est ; Cf. II. VII. 17, (Epicurus) affirmat enim quodam loco " si uratur sapiens, si eructetur,"—expectas fortasse dum dicat ; " patietur, perferet, non succumbet ;" magna me-hercule laus et eo ipso, per quem turavi, Hercule digna ; sed Epicuro, homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis ; in Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet ; " Quam suave est ! quam hoc non euro !" Suave etiam ? an parum est, si non amarum ? ex perpetuitate atque constantia, from the continuity and consistency of their teachings.**

XI. 32. **quartum de Finibus :** Thus Quintilian, in *T. Livii primo : IX. 2.37.* The allusion is to Chapter XX. In the fourth book *de Finibus*, the New Academy assails Zeno and the Stoics. In Chap. XX. occurs this passage :

"Nor did he (Zeno) think those things deserving of being valued less which he himself denied to be goods than they who did consider them as goods. What, then, did he wish to effect by having altered these names? At least he would have taken something from their weight and would have valued them at rather less than the Peripatetics, in order to appear to think in some respects differently from them, and not merely to speak so," etc.

hoc: object of *ostendere*, and has the *nihil . . . interesse* clause as appositive. **verborum novitatem**: See note above. **Quod si**, etc. If they differ only in words, agreeing in fact, and if Zeno can consistently hold, etc., then the Peripatetics can consistently hold the same.

33. **tabellis obsignatis**, from sealed writings, i. e., in strictest form. Cf. *ex syngrapha agere*. **nos**: i. e., of the Middle Academy to whose sceptical doctrine, that certainty is unattainable, Cicero subscribed. He boasts of the freedom of his school (*soli sumus liberi*), whereby he can advocate any doctrine he may fancy at the time (*in diem*). He cares nothing for inconsistencies. See INTRODUCTION; *The Middle Academy*. **de constantia**: in the preceding Chapter —respecting Epicurus. **verumne**: the adj. is the predicate with *sit*, whose subject is the clause, *bonum esse s. q. h. esset*. **quod honestum esset**; thus excluding so-called external goods. Historical tense because of time past, i. e. of Zeno, (*placuerit*). Read **si ita esset** for *ni ita esset*: if this view (of Zeno) be correct; if we admit it. **totum hoc beate vivere**; object of *poneret*. **si ita esset . . . poneret**: The tense is imperfect through the influence of the preceding *honestum esset*. This sentence has been variously emended. The reading *ni* for *si*, *num* for *tum*, with *ponerent* for *poneret*, is one emendation. Another reads *si . . . poneretur*, inserting *volui* before *ut*, etc. Heine thinks that *volui* is implied in *poneret* which he changes to *ponentur*. If we read *si ita esset . . . poneret*, the meaning is: Conceding his view, whether then he makes the happy life entirely dependent on virtue, as a matter of fact. If we read *ni ita esset . . . poneret*, it would mean: If his view be incorrect, and there are other goods besides the *honestum*, whether then he will rest happiness entirely on virtue. That is consistent with what follows, for that was the position of Brutus. See below. **tum ut**, etc., is dependent on *verum*, true; i. e., whether it is true then that, etc., and *poneret* expresses result after *verum sit*.

34. **viderit**; probably a fut. pf. R. 1585. For the opinion of Brutus, see VIII. 21. **beatissimus**; Cf. VIII., 22, 23.

XII. **advena**; Zeno was a native of Cittium in Cyprus, originally a colony from Phoenicia. Cicero speaks of Zeno as a *Poenulus*, Phoenician. **verborum opifex**; Cf. *de Fin.* III. II. 5, "Zeno too, their chief, was not so much a discoverer of new things as of new

words." See note in XI. 32, and INTRODUCTION. **insinuasse se :** Cicero also uses the verb without the reflexive in the same sense. **a Platonis auctoritate :** "Their (the Stoic's) doctrines contained little that was new, seeking rather to give a practical application to the dogmas which they took ready made from previous systems." In Ethics they largely followed the Old Academy as well as Socrates and the Cynics. **velut ;** Cf. V. 13, note. **in Georgia :** in Plato's dialogue entitled *Gorgias*. **Archelaum :** King of Macedonia (413-399 B. C.), and son of Perdiccas II. He obtained the throne by slaying his half-brother. A patron of art and literature, his place was adorned with splendid paintings of Zeuxis, and men of eminence, as Euripides, were entertained by him.

35. **Haud scio :** not so definite in its negative answer as *nescio*. **an tu**, etc. A. 211. b : H. 353. 2. N. 4. **quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus :** Socrates aimed to establish an objective rule of practical life. This standard he saw in *knowledge* with which he identified *virtue*. **in eo :** that is, in this condition of knowledge and virtue. **iniustus :** justice with Socrates was a crowning virtue. So also with Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.

36. **in Epitaphio :** the funeral oration of Pericles over the Athenians, at the close of the first year of the Peloponnesian war; in Plato's *Menexenus*. See Timayenis, History of Greece, Vol. I., p. 283. **apta :** depending upon, (in this sense, only in Cic.) Used both with *ex* as here and without it as in XIV. 40, *rudentibus apta fortuna*. See Lex. s. *apo*. B. **suspensa,** depend, rest on. In this sense very rare. Cf. with *apta ex* in last note, and *pendere ex* in this sentence. **praecepto :** *i. e.*, *in se ipso omnem spem reponet sui*. Cf. X. 30, *omniaque sibi in sese esse posita*. "The wise man [of the Stoics] is he who, being perfect in his knowledge of the laws of the universe, above all passion, and completely governed by reason, is perfectly self-contained and self-satisfied."

XIII. The argument of the Chapter is this: Everything in nature is destined to the complete development of its kind. All implicitly follow the law of nature. Each has its peculiar excellencies which abide with it. Man's superior gift is his spiritual nature, soul and mind, the perfect development of which constitutes virtue; wherein man reaches the perfection of his kind, which must be synonymous with happiness.

37. **hieme**; temporal. **fundat**, produces abundantly. **quantum . . . sit**: Subj. by attraction.

38. Take **etiam** with *facilius*. Observe the variety of distributive terms, *alias . . . alias*, *quasdam . . . quasdam*, (Chiasmus also); *partim . . . partim*, *alias*, *quasdam*, *non nullas*. **praecipui**: Gen. partitive. **etsi**, *although*; corrective. See Lex. s. v. II. **habent aliquem comparationem**, *that admit of comparison*. **decerptus ex mente divina**: A Stoic tenet. Plato had borrowed this doctrine from Pythagoras. Cf. *Cat. M.* XXI. 78.

39. **absoluta ratio**: The Stoics enthroned reason, and sought to bring every impulse under its control. **quod est idem virtus**: "He who has a right judgment and right intention is perfectly virtuous, he who is without right judgment and intention is perfectly vicious." **et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto**, etc. So far they agree, but Cicero and the Stoics hold that this (*virtus*) suffices for *vita beatissima*, the others that other goods must supplement *virtus* to bring about this result. The Stoics say, that if anything not in man's power were allowed to influence his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of virtue.

40. **tripertito**: Cf. VIII. 23, note, and X. 29, 30, and notes.

XIV. **istorum**: *of those goods*. **non sane**, *not very*; softens the negation; *sane non* would strengthen it. **rudentibus apta**; Cf. XII. 36, *apta* and note. A knot in a rope was all that intervened between safety and possible destruction.

41. **volumus**, *we hold*; implying that the opinion is open for discussion. **saeptum atque munitum**, constitute together a single member of the series. Why? A. 208. b. 1 and 2; H. 554. I. 6. **parvo metu praeditus**; *praeditus* is used with qualities both good and bad—more commonly the former. **parva metuit**; T. has *parvo metu est*. **alia . . . nisi**, *else than*. See Lex. s. *alus* I. B. Say the Stoics, "bravery is fearless obedience to the law of reason, both in boldness and endurance." Zr. **procul** in the sense of *liber*, as frequently in Livy.

42. **Qui autem**, *further how*. **securitatem**, *freedom from care*. **aegritudinis**, *anxiety, grief*. Cf. VI. 16, note. **celsus et erectus**, *noble and elevated*. **omnia sibi**; See X. 30, note. **tali animo**; characteristic. **civitas universa**; as Lacedaemon or Sparta, (*Lacedaemonii*). **fortitudinem, temperantia**: two of the

four virtues which most Stoics held,—the others being prudence and justice. See V. 14, note. **commotionum, emotions or passions.** **aegritudine, metu, libido, insolenti alacritate;** Cf. VI. 15, and note on *motus turbulenti*; also XV. 43; XVI. 48, *sine metu*, etc. **alacritate, ecstasy, rapture.** Cf. XV. 43, *lactitia gestiens.*

XV. 43. **quod aegritudo,** etc. pain and fear are classed as fancied evils, pleasure and desire as imagined goods, in each case the one a present evil or good, the other a future. We must get rid of such beliefs and arrive at a state of indifference to them, is the Stoic teaching. See VI. 16, note. **in bonorum....errore = in bonis opinatis.** The author varies the expression. We have following the famous chain argument of the Stoics. **Atque etiam omne bonum,** etc. See VII. 18, *ante docuisse*, note. **praedicandum, extolled.**

44. **quibus abundantem:** A. 248. *c.* 2; H. 421. II. **licet esse:** for *licet* with inf. with subject acc. See A. 331. *i.* N. 3; H. 538.

45. **iniustus,** etc. Note the enumeration of the vices, the opposite of the highest virtues, and cf. note on *fortitudinem*, etc. in XIV. 42. **atque nullo:** the *atque* has a climacteric effect, *and in fact.* See Lex. s. v. I. B. b. **videamus ne:** Cf. I. XXXIV. 83, and R. 1656. **sola** is not to be taken with *quaerere*, but with the predicate. **beatum = beata vita** for sake of variety. **quid, how.** **Etenim,** etc. Cf. XV. 43.

XVI. 46. **minima, of slight value.** **color suavis, a fine complexion.** **Anticlea:** a slip for Euryklea, the nurse of Ulysses. Anticlea was his mother. **Ulixii:** Cf. I. XLI. 98; also A. 43. *a*; H. 68. **Lenitudo,** etc. A catalectic trochaic tetrameter or septenarius, from the *Niptra* of Pacuvius, imitated from Sophocles. The death of Ulysses was the subject. **gravitate, dignity, moral earnestness.** **aut gravius aut grandius:** paronomasia. Cf. *Salvus....sanus*, XXI. 62.

47. **At enim:** the *enim* introduces a reason for the objection implied in *at*. The reply, partly concessive, frequently has *et quidem*, or *quidem* as here. R. 1623. **praecipua:** The Stoics regarded everything that was not positively good or evil (virtue or vice) as indifferent (*media*). But among things indifferent there are, on comparison, necessarily preferences. Some, such as health, wealth,

talent, rank, were regarded as having comparative value, and were classed as *principia, producta, praeposita*: their opposites were termed *reiecta, remota, reiectanca*. The *media, indifferentia*, as a special class, became thus limited to those things which could not influence choice. **hi autem**: the Peripatetics. **Socratica illa conclusione**: only the first part of the conclusion is from Socrates. The second part, *Adfectus autem*, etc., Cicero, or his Greek authority, has added.

48. **etenim**: A. 156. *d*; H. 554. V. 2. **alacritate**=*insolenti alacritate*, XIV. 42. See note. **Refert autem omnia ad beate vivendum**: not in the sense of making happiness the end to be attained, but of regarding it as the concomitant of virtue. The *vita laudabilis* is the *vita honesta=vita beata*; and in the *vita honesta* resides *virtus, the summum bonum*.

XVII. 49. **Et=atqui**. See Lex. s. v. E. **in aliqua vita, in some kinds of life**. **gloriandum**; *gloriari* with a direct object (except cognate acc.) is rare and post-clas. The gerundive is thus used here. See also next paragraph, *beata vita glorianda....est*.

Epaminondas; The famous Theban statesman and general. Died 362 B. C. He was the hero of Leuctra and Mantinea, and in his life, both public and private, characterized by the utmost integrity, he practised the lessons of philosophy of which he was an ardent student. **Consiliis**, etc. Pausanias gives the epigram in full. **est attonsa**; Greek *ἐξείρωτο*. **Africanus**: *A. Maior*, (234-183 B. C.). **A sole**, etc. The distich is from Ennius and is quoted by Seneca, *Ep.* XVIII. 5, where two more verses are given: “*Si fas endo plagas caelestum ascendere cuiquam est, Mi soli caeli maxima porta patet*. The meter is the elegiac. **supra**; instead of this another writer quotes *ad usque*. **Maeotis**: Gen., for Maeotidis. The *s* does not make “position.” Lake Maeotis, now the Sea of Azov. **aequipe-rarē**: sc. me.

51. **libra illa Critolai**; *Critolaus*, a Peripatetic philosopher, was one of the three Athenian ambassadors to Rome in 155 B. C. For the allusion in *libra* compare the following from *de Fin.* V. XXX. 91, where Piso is setting forth the Peripatetic doctrines in opposition to the Stoic; “I will venture to call goods whatever is in accordance with nature....and I will place that noble quality, virtue (*virtutis amplitudinem*), in the other pan of the balance, so to

speak. Believe me that man will outweigh (*deprimet*) earth and seas. **animi bona....corporis et externa**; See XXX. 85, and X. 22, *ulla corporis aut fortunae mala*, and note. **tantum propendere**, press down so heavily. **illam lancem**; i. e. containing the *bona animi*. **deprimat**, weigh down, i. e. force up the scale containing *bona corporis et externa*. Critolaus had probably first used this figure.

XVIII. **Xenocratem**: See X. 30. **exaggerantem**=*extollen-*
tem. Cf. XXX. 85; also see XIII. 39, note.

52. **formido**, etc. sc. *cadit*. **formido**, dread, overpowering the understanding; **timiditas**, fearfulness as an habitual quality; **ignavia**, a blamable *inaptitude* for any noble action; **metus**, fear, as from reflection. See D. s. *vereri*; Cf. also **pavor**, consternation, a being disheartened. **ergo**: sc. *in eum etiam cadit*. **Atrei**: Atreus, king of Mycenae, was the son of Pelops and father of Agamemnon and Menelaus. **Proinde**: a dissyllable here. The verse is an iambic trimeter from Accius, and is probably from the *Atreus quae, and these qualities*.

53. **ut nihil** (acc.) **paeniteat**: sc. *sapientem*. A. 221. c; H. 408. III; Z. 442. Cf. XXVIII. 81, *quod paenitere possit*. **omnia profluenter**: sc. *se habebunt*. **absolute**=*perfecte*. **igitur**: A. 156. k; H. 554. IV. 3; Z. 357.

XIX. From this point to Chapter XXIV. are given illustrations to show that vice is productive of misery, virtue of happiness.

54. **C. Laelii**: *Caius Laelius Sapiens*, the intimate friend of the younger Africanus, was consul in B. C. 140. **cum repulsa**: In 141 B. C. he was defeated for the office. This sentence might have ended with *quattuor Cinnac consulibus* to give the author's meaning. But after the parenthesis he changes the form, *sed tamen*, etc. An anacoluthon. **malles te....consulem**: double acc. with *esse* omitted, as often.

Cinnam: *L. Cornelius Cina* was an adherent of the party of Marius and consul in the years 87, 86, 85 and 84 B. C. In his first consulship he sought to recall Marius from exile, but failed and fled to escape the vengeance of his colleague *Cn. Octavius* and the Senate, and was deposed. But he collected an army and, with Marius, laid siege to Rome. The capture of the city was followed by mur-

ders and proscriptions. Catulus, the noble colleague of Marius in the battle against the Cimbri, was one of the victims whose death the latter demanded, as related in this chapter (56). Cinna was assassinated by his soldiers in 84 B. C.

55. **video cui committam**: Cicero's friend was doubtless in political sympathy with him. **collegae sui**: emphasized by position before the proper name. **Cn. Octavii**; He was one of the first victims. His head was cut off and suspended from the Rostra. **P. Crassi**; surnamed *Dives*. Father of the triumvir; took his own life. **L. Caesaris**; *L. Julius Caesar Strabo*, consul in 90 B. C., censor in 89 with Crassus as his colleague; great uncle of *M. Antonius*, the triumvir. **M. Antonii**; the orator, grandfather of the triumvir; consul in 99 B. C. His head was suspended from the Rostra. **C. Caesaris**: surnamed *Strabo Vopiscus*, was a brother of the *L. Caesar* mentioned above. He was famous as an orator and is one of the speakers in Cicero's *de Oratore*. **specimen, ideal**. Cf. I. XIV. 32, *specimen naturae. liceret, it was lawful. sermonis errore*; Cicero shows that the term, *licere*, may be used of what is legally right or permitted, although morally wrong.

56. **cum....communicavit**; After defeating the Teutoni and Ambrones at Aquae Sextiae in his fourth consulship, Marius joined the proconsul *Q. Lutatius Catulus*, and they jointly gained a great victory over the Cimbri at Campi Raudii, near Vercellae. This was in 101 B. C., in the 5th consulship of Marius. **Moriatur**; See note on *Cinnam.* (54). He is said to have suffocated himself with the fumes of charcoal. **sex....consulatus**; 107 and 104-100 B. C. He was a seventh time consul in 86 B. C., but died on the eighteenth day after entering on his office. **obruere, dim or destroy the glory of**.

XX. 57. **Dionysius; the Elder**, b. 430 B. C. He became sole general in 405 and began his reign of tyranny, which continued until his death in 367. **in victu temperantiam**: and yet his death is said to have been caused by excessive feasting. **veritatem, the true state of the case. omnia se posse, that he had unlimited power.** Elliptical.

58. **alius alio modo**; He was born in a private station. Plotius says he was a mule-driver, Diodorus Siculus, that he was a clerk. **aequalium familiaritatibus, familiar intercourse with his contem-**

poraries. consuetudine propinquorum, intimate association with his kinsmen. **credebat**=*fidem habebat*. The direct object is expressed. **ex familiis locupletium**, *from the family-servants of the rich.* **servos**; attracted into the relative clause. **quibus**; etc. He had manumitted them and termed them "new citizens." **tondere**: used absolutely. **artificio**, *employment*; abl. manner. **tonstriculae**; Other authors mention female barbers; for example, Plaut. *Truc.* II. 4. 51. **ferrum**, *a razor.*

59. **duas uxores**: after the death of his first wife he married the two here named at about the same time, possibly the same day. **civem suam**; sister of Dion, who was in high favor with Dionysius, and for a time, later, supplanted, as tyrant, the younger Dionysius, his nephew. **Locrensem**; the Locris of which Doris was a native was situated in the south-eastern part of the country of the Bruttii. Her son, the younger Dionysius, made himself tyrant of the place when he was expelled from Syracuse. **Cubiculari lecto**: probably the edifice or pavilion in which his bed stood. *cubiculari* is from *cubicularis*—instead of *cubicularius*, the usual form. **coniunxisset**=*coniungendo effecisset*.

60. **pila ludere**: Playing ball was a favorite sport and exercise with both Greeks and Romans. The Emperor Augustus used to play, and men getting along in years would play for the purpose of warding off old age. Every complete gymnasium had a room devoted to this exercise, and special teachers gave instruction in ball-playing. Foot-ball was a favorite game at Sparta. The base-ball of these days was unknown then. See Dict. Antiq. s. *pila*. **poneret**, *laid aside.* **impotentium**, *incapable of self-control.* Cf. *impotenti*, VII. 17.

61. **iudicavit**, *declared his judgment.*

XXI. **Damocles**; Horace alludes to the story in *Od.* III., I. **copias**, *riches.* **opes**, *power.* **pulcherrimo textili stragulo**: The conjunction between the adjectives is omitted because the *textili stragulo* express a single idea. **ministrare**: the proper word for waiting or serving at table.

62. **odores**=*suffimenta*; effect for cause. **defluebant**=*sensim delabebantur*. Cf. Liv. II. 20, *moribundus (de equo) ad terram defluxit*. **satisne**: The *-ne*=*nonne*. A. 210. d. **aliqui**: the adj. form here properly used. **integrum....erat ut**, etc. A. 332; H.

501.2; Z. 623. Cf. VII. 17, *integrum non est. Salvus....sanus:* paronomasia.

XXII. 63. *in Pythagoriis duobis illis:* Damon and Phintias. See *de Fin.* II. XXIV. 79, where Cicero also alludes to the friendship of Orestes and Pylades. **adscriberer**: Force of the imperf. subjunc.? **miserum**, *afflicting*. **docto**, *educated*. **Musicorum....perstudiosum**: On account of the parenthesis the sentence is incomplete. *musicorum* is neuter. Cf. I. XXIV. 57, *si geometrica dedicisset*. **poetam etiam tragicum**: He is said to have contended repeatedly at Athens for the prize of tragedy, but obtained only second and third prizes until just before his death, when he won the first prize at the Lenaea, an Attic festival of Dionysus or Bacchus, with a play entitled "The Ransom of Hector." **in hoc....genere**: poets. **neminem**: A. 202, *f. 2*; H. 457. 1. **cum Aquino**: A bad poet, also mentioned by Catullus 14. 18. **omni cultu et victu humano**, *of all refinement and social intercourse with men*.

XXIII. 64. **Archytæ**: *Archytas of Tarentum*, (fl. B. C. 400-365?) was a Pythagorean and a friend of Plato who was probably indebted to him for some of his views. He was distinguished as a general and a statesman. Like all Pythagoreans he gave much attention to mathematics and became eminent as a mathematician. His wooden flying dove was the wonder of the ancients. **humilem homunculum**; *Archimedes* (287-212 B. C.) was of humble origin and poor. Sil. Ital. XIV. 342, says

*Vir fuit Isthmiacis decus immortale colonis,
Ingenio facile ante omnes telluris alumnos,
Nudus opum, sed cui caelum terraeque paterent.*

He aided materially in defending Syracuse by his engines, but was slain by a Roman soldier at the taking of the city. He was the first to ascertain the ratio of the radius to the circumference and of the cylinder to the sphere, and that a body dipped in water loses as much weight as that of the water displaced. He invented the pulley, the endless screw, an orrery, showing the motions of the heavenly bodies, etc. Some of his writings are still extant. **a pulvere et radio**; The mathematicians used to strew a table with sand (*pulvis*) and in this draw their figures with a rod (*radius*). Cf. *de Nat. Deorum*, II. 18.48, *nunquam eruditum illum pulverem attigistis, you have*

'never taught mathematics. **ego quaestor**: In 75 B. C. under the praetor of Lilybaeum, Sex. Paducaeus. **spheram . . . cum cylindro**; Archimedes first discovered the relation which the cubic contents of the sphere bears to those of the cylinder.

65. **ad portas Achradinas**; *Achradina* was one of the five parts or towns of which Syracuse consisted, and occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortigia. Other readings are *Agragianas* and *Aragentinias*, meaning the "Aragentine" gate at Syracuse in the direction of Agrigentum. **animum adverti**=*animadvertisi*. In the classical period these words are usually contracted to *animadvertisi*. **erant autem**; the *autem* is transitional, now.

66. **ad adversam basim**, *to the front of the pedestal*. **exesis**, *effaced*. **Graeciae**=*Magnae Graeciae*. **unius acutissimi**; Observe how the superlative is strengthened by *unius*. See also *unus suavissimus* in this same paragraph. **homine Arpinati**; Cicero was born at *Arpinum* in Latium. **cum humanitate**, *with liberal culture*. **actionemque**, *and their employments*. **cum oblectatione sollertiae**, *with the pleasure that comes from a consciousness of skill*. **in caede et iniuriis**; *Zeugma*. For *albatur* supply *versabatur*.

67. **eius**; *i. e.*, of the mind. **igitur**; Note the position of *igitur*. **existere**, *proceeds, arises*.

XXIV. 68. **moventia**, *motives*. The *quasi* softens the unusual expression; *moventia*, *springs of action*. **intellegentiamque**, *and understanding*. **nobis**; Dat. A. 232. a; H. 388. **fingatur**, *conceived of, imaged*. **tardis enim mentibus**; Dat. Cf. XXXV. 100, *huie vitae*. Cicero uses this verb (as if *comitem esse*) with the dat. in only three instances. **triplex ille animi fetus**; Physics, ethics, dialectics; *i. e.* a knowledge of all branches of philosophy. **unus . . . alter . . . tertius**: more common in Cie. than *primus*, *secundus*, *tertius*. Cf. I. XVII. 40, *una, altera*.

69. **cum his . . . curis**; *i. e.* the problems of philosophy, and the pleasure experienced in their investigation. **ut**, *for example*. **perspexerit, viderit**: time future to that expressed in *adisci necesse est*, which is future in sense. **eius ipsius**; *i. e.* *totius mundi*. **Septem alia**; the five planets and the sun and moon. **rata**, *fixed, unalterable*. **sustineantur**: change of tense from perfect to present; a common usage. **qua gravitate**; depends on *delata*. It is better to omit the *in* and connect the *qua* with *gravitate*.

XXV. 70. In paragraphs 70 and 71 the pleasures of the study of moral philosophy are set forth. **praecepta, enjoined.** **illa cognitio**: See I. XXII. 52. **compleatur**: Bentley emends *completur*. The subjunctive must be explained as result; the indicative would state it as a fact simply. **illius aeternitatis imitandi**: The *imitandi* may possibly stand for *imitandae*, which would make the construction regular. Cf. A. 298. a; H. 542. I. Note 1. Tischer reads *aeternitatem*. **illius**: sc. *mentis*. **in brevitate vitae conlocatam**, *confined to this short life*. *Conlocatam* refers back to *cogitatio*, while the thinking mind is in fact the subject of *putat*. **ex aliis aptas**, *depending upon (arising from) others*. The expression is Ciceronian. See Lex. s. v. I. B. **quibus** refers to *rerum*; **fluentibus** to the constant changes in things.

71. **intuens** means attentive contemplation, **suspiciens** implies here respect. **citeriora=terrestria.** **genera partesque**: *pars*, not *species* stands opposed to *genus*. Cf. III. XI. 24. **extremum in bonis=summum bonum.** **ultimum=summum**. Cf. *de Fin.* I. IV. 11, "quid sequatur natura, ut summum ex rebus expetendis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum."

72. **tertia**: i. e. Logic. The gender is due to the concluding words of the sentence. **genera dispertit**: See note on *genera partesque*, 71. **perfecta concludit**: states the conclusion syllogistically. **ratio, art.** *Transeat*, etc. A Stoic view and opposed to the Epicurean. Epicurus and Metrodorus thought it folly to take part in public life. **contineri prudentia, firmly established through his prudence.** **iustitia**: Abl. *in suam domum*: Not the home but the locality is designated. Hence the preposition. **tam variisque**; the *-que* is necessary because *tam variis* expresses a single idea. **paene, I may say.** **cultu atque victu**: Cf. XXII. 63, note. **Fortuna ipsa cedat**: Cf. *Parad.* V. I. 34, *cui quidem (sapienti) etiam, quae vim habere maximam dicitur, fortunam ipsa cedit.* **beatum=beatitas.**

XXVI. 73. *in viola, of one bedded on violets.* **in rosa**: Cf. Hor. *Od.* I. 5, 1. **an Epicuro**, etc. The antithesis to this clause might have been *ceteris philosophis idem dicere non licebit?* But Cicero takes up the matter afresh in 75, *sed cum is dicat* etc. **ut habet se res**: i. e. when one considers only the matter itself. **dolore definiat**, etc. The pleasure that with Epicurus is the chief good is

"freedom of the body from pain and the soul from confusion."

honestā turpia: asyndeton in opposition. Z. 782. R. 2204 (b). Cf. A. 208. b; H. 636. I. 1; also I. XXVI. 64, *supera infera*, etc.

aut leve aut asperum in corpore sentiatur: Epicurus reduces all knowledge to touch; for he holds that the senses are the only source of knowledge, and these give us a true perception of that which comes into contact with them. Lucretius teaches that the sense of taste is agreeable when it is acted on by smooth atoms and disagreeable when the atoms are rough. **huic....ferarum**: The expression is abbreviated as in I. I. 2, *illa....sunt conferenda. obli-*

visci....sui, to forget his own chief tenet.

74. **illa**: such as the Stoics provide. **recordatione....prae-**
teritorum voluptatium: Cf. XXXI. 88.

"While the Cyrenaics maintained that bodily pleasures and pains were the keenest, Epicurus claimed these characteristics for the pleasures of the mind, which intensified the present feeling by anticipations of the future and recollections of the past. And thus the wise man might be happy even on the rack." *Marshall, Hist. Gk. Phil.*

"Listen....to the words of Epicurus when dying; and observe how inconsistent is his conduct with his language. 'Epicurus to Hermarchus greeting: I write this letter', he says, 'while passing a happy day, which is also the last day of my life. And the pains of....and bowels are so intense that nothing can be added to them which can make them greater.' Here is a man miserable if pain is the greatest possible evil. It cannot possibly be denied. However, let us see how he proceeds, 'But still I have to balance this a joy in my mind, which I derive from the recollection of my philosophical principles and discoveries. But do you....protect the children of Metrodorus.' After reading this I do not consider the death of Epaminnondas or Leonidas preferable to his....The deaths of generals are glorious, but philosophers usually die in their beds. But still Epicurus says when dying, 'I have a joy to counterbalance these pains.' I recognize in these words, O Epicurus, the sentiments of a philosopher, but still you forgot what you ought to have said, For, in the first place, if those things be true, in the recollection of which you say you rejoice, that is to say, if your writings and discoveries are true, then you can not rejoice. For you have no pleasure here which you can refer to the body. But you have constantly asserted that no one ever feels joy or pain except with reference to his body. 'I rejoice,' says he, 'in the past.' In what that is past? If you mean such past things as refer to the body then I see that you are counterbalancing your agonies with your reason, and not with your recollection of pleasures which you have felt in the body. But if you are referring to your mind, then your denial of there being any joy of the mind which cannot be referred to some pleasure of the body, must be false. Why, then, do you recommend the children of Metrodorus to Hermarchus? In that admirable exercise of duty, in that excellent

display of your good faith, (for that is how I look upon it), what is there that you refer to the body?" *de Fin.* II. xxx.

Some texts have *voluptatum*. **Arpinati nostro**: sc. *fundo*. **Arpinum**—the birthplace of Cicero—lies in a mountainous district near the junction of the Fibrenus and Liris. **mala praesentia præteritae voluptates**; chiasmus.

75. **iis qui... existimant**; i. e. the Stoics and many adherents of the New Academy. The sentiment *semper beatum esse sapientem* is consistent, not with the view of Epicurus, but with that of the Stoics,—that virtue is alone sufficient for a happy life. **balbutire**: for they held that happiness, although found only in virtue, is increased by external goods. Cf. VIII. 23, and IX. 24, and notes. **in Phalaridis taurum**; Cf. II. VII. 17, *in Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet*; *Quam suave est, quam hoc non curo!* The sense of the last two sentences is this: Epicurus is inconsistent in saying that happiness can exist with pain, for he holds pain to be the sole evil; he encroaches on the ground of the Stoics who hold pain to be indifferent; while the Peripatetics and the adherents of the Old Academy (see last note, *balbutire*,) are as inconsistent as Epicurus, for, as external goods are essential to happiness, pain must destroy it. Let them, then, allow, as do the Stoics, that happiness consists in virtue alone!

XXVII. 76. **tria genera bonorum**: See VIII. 23. **laqueis, subtleties**. See XVI. 47, note. **sint sane illa**, etc. Cicero will concede more than the Stoics, viz. that external and corporal goods are actual goods in proper subordination to those of the mind (*illa divina*). **sumenda, taken for use**. The term is a technical term of the Stoics, its opposite being *reticienda*. [ut]; if the *ut* be permitted to stand, there is an anacoluthon, the author intending to close his sentence with a result clause, as *beatus aut potius beatissimus dicendus sit*, or something like this. **Dolorem vero**, etc. A suggested objection which he meets in the next paragraph (77). **Is: dolor. huic...sententiae**: scil. *sapientem beatissimum esse. contra mortem*, etc. See in INTRODUCTION I, the subjects of the five books, wherein Cicero has labored to prove that death, pain, grief and other mental perturbations are not evils. In this book we have the final proposition which naturally follows, viz. that virtue is of itself sufficient for a happy life, and the sole criterion of the wise

man. **ardentes faces**: So in II. XXV. 61, *cumque quasi faces ei doloris admoverentur.*

77. **Pueri Spartiatae....laniati**; Cf. II. XIV. 34, *Spartae vero pueri ad aram [of Diana Orthia] sic verberibus accipiuntur, ut multus e visceribus sanguis exeat, non nunquam etiam, ut, cum ibi essem, audiebam, ad necem; quorum non modo nemo exclamavit, umquam, sed ne ingemuit quidem. Quid ergo? hoc pueri possunt, viri non poterunt? et mos valebit, ratio non valebit?* Cf. II. XX. 46. **prius**; with the sense of *potius*. **barbaria**; sc *terra*. **qui sapientes habentur**; called by the Greeks *γυρωσογισται*, the Brahmns. **Caucasi**: the name is given to the extension of the Caucasus even to India,—*i. e.* the Hindoo Coosh or the Himalaya Mts.

78. **Mulieres vero**: answers to the *primum ei* of the preceding sentence. So in I. XIII. 30, *primum*; and *Maximum vero* (XIV. 31). The custom referred to is said to exist still despite the efforts of the English authorities and the missionaries. **illa victa**: as though there were but two. An indication of careless composition. **umbbris**, *dreamy lives*. **privatatis erroribus**, *with their own perversely erroneous views*. **ibim aut aspidem**, etc. The same animals were not reverenced alike in all parts of Egypt. The crocodile might be killed with impunity in some parts. The ibis and the cat were held sacred everywhere.

79. **montivagos**; found only here in prose. The whole passage is poetical. **vulnera excipiant**; *excipiant* would imply, “*willingly*” receive. **ambitiosi....laudis studiosi**: Nom. The latter phrase is our “ambitious”, the former means eagerness for honorable public station.

XXVIII. 80. **illuc unde deflexit**: viz. to the subject suggested in the question with which chapter XXVI. begins; whether a wise man can be happy in the midst of pain, etc., **nec=et non**, and the *non* negatives *consistet* and *resistet*. **consistet**, *will it stop short*; opposed to *prosecuta* as is *resistet* below. **ut ante dixi**: See V. 13. **foedi...deformius**; The *foedus* offends the natural feelings, causing aversion; the *deformis* offends the finer sensations, causing dislike—opposed to *formosus*; *turpis* offends the moral feelings. D.

81. **quod poenitere possit**; Cf. XVIII. 53. The *quod* is nom., and expresses an indefinite object of emotion. R. 1329 Cf. A. 221. c. where the *quod* is expressly given as an acc., and with this agrees

Tischer, H. 410. IV. **nihil invitum, splendide....omnia**: observe the Chiasmus. The emphasis is thus strengthened. **nihil....admirari**, *to be disturbed by nothing*; by this, meaning anything that could disturb the sage's serenity. The reader will recall the *Nil admirari* of Horace. *Epist.* I. 6. 1.

82. **senserint=iudicaverint. congruere....vivere**: subject of *esse*. Note the Chiasmus. **vita beata** (*sit*): Nom. **quo modo nunc est**, *as the matter now stands*; *i. e.* according to our conclusions to this point.

XXIX. **impetrarim libentur ut**: Anacoluthon. We should have, following the *ut*, a purpose clause like *id me doceas, quem ad modum*, etc., but, as often, for clearness' sake, after a long intervening clause, Cicero begins anew, *id velim audire*. **nulla vincula**, etc. refers to Cicero's adherence to the teachings of the Middle or New Academy. See XI. 33, note, and 83 below. He dislikes the Stoic dogmatism. **paulo ante**: XXVI. 75. **his**: *i. e.* *Peripateticis et veteribus Academicis*. **contra istam sententiam**: *i. e.* their fundamental teaching, that the wise man is always *beatus* but not always *beatissimus*. **conclusa**: sc. *sunt*.

83. **habetur in omnes partes**, *considers the views of all*. **ut....iudicari**; *i. e.* can be judged solely on its merits, no great name giving it credence. **hoc velle ut ...virtus satis habeat**; Brachylogy for *ut a nobis demonstretur virtutem....habere*. **de finibus**; sc. *bonorum et malorum*. See XXX. 84. **quod quidem**; The relative refers to the clause, *virtus satis....praesidii*, which is repeated in the *illud* below. **Carneadem**: See IV. 11, note. See INTRODUCTION. **sed is**; sc. *id egit*, as implied in what follows. **ut contra Stoicos**, as (*i. e. since*), *it was against the Stoics*. He vehemently opposed the dogmatism of the Stoics, and held that probability is the utmost that can be attained. See INTRODUCTION. **quod quidem....exarserat** is really parenthetic. **posiverunt**: an archaic form.

84. **ut....possit**; depends on *quaeramus*. **quasi decretum**; The word *decretum* as a philosophical term in the sense of dogma, was new to the Romans; hence the *quasi*. Cf. *Acad.* II. IX. 29, *Quoniam enim id haberent Academicici decretum—sentitis enim iam hoc me δόγμα dicere*, etc.

XXX. **Hieronymus**; *Of Rhodes*, about 300-260 B. C.,—was a

disciple of Aristotle, and is classed as a Peripatetic, although Cicero says of him, *de Fin.* V. V. 14, "I do not know why I should call him a Peripatetic, for he defined the highest good to be freedom from pain." **naturae primis bonis**; Cicero in *de Fin.* V. VII. 18, says,

"Some people consider the first desire to be a desire of pleasure, and the first thing which men seek to ward off to be pain, others think that the first thing wished for is freedom from pain, and the first thing shunned, pain; and from these men others proceed, who call the first goods natural ones; among which they reckon the safety and integrity of all one's parts, good health, the senses unimpaired, freedom from pain, strength, beauty, and other things of the same sort, the images or which are the first things in the mind, like the sparks and the seeds of the virtues."

85. **tria genera bonorum**: See VIII. 22, note; also IX. 25, note. **Dinomachus et Callipho**: Of these philosophers little is known. Cicero condemns their theory in *de Off.* III. XXIII. 119, as follows; "who supposed that they could reconcile the antagonistic views of the Stoics and the Epicureans, by uniting the honorable (virtue) with pleasure, like uniting man with beast." **indolentiam, freedom from pain**. **Diodorus**: of Tyre, a disciple of Critolaus,—about, 110 B. C. **Aristonis**: See XVIII. 27, note. He differed from Zeno in considering all the indifferent (*ἀδιάχρονα*) as equally indifferent. Cf. XVI. 47, note. **Pyrrhonis**;—about 320 B. C.—A native of Elis and founder of the Sceptical or Pyrronian School of Philosophy. He was probably influenced by the views of Democritus. He left no writings, but his pupil Timon of Phlius wrote voluminously. "When the Academy became sceptical there was no room for an independent Pyrrhonist school, but it revived....when the Academy became identified with an eclectic dogmatism under Antiochus." Pyrrho held that the wise man cares nothing for the indifferent (*ἀδιάχρονα*). **Herilli**: *Herillus of Carthage*, a disciple of Zeno, hence a Stoic. He held, however, that knowledge (*scientia*) is the highest good. **evanuerunt**; Cic. in *de Off.* I. II. 6, says: *Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Herilli iam pridem explosa sententia est*. Later these views, permeated by a new principle, were revived with much greater energy in the Christian Church. **obtinere**, *maintain*. Cf. I. XII. 26. **explicata**, (adj.) *clear*. Cf. Cic. *Planc.* 2. 5, *causa facilis atque explicata*. **praeter Theophrastum**=*excepto Theophrasto*, the more common method of expression in prose. For the views of

T. see IX. 24. 25, notes. **licet**: *i.e.* as their principles permit them to do. **exaggerent**: See XVIII. 51, and note. **ex conlatione, in comparison (with virtue)**. **conterere**: as if to tread under foot. In contrast with *ad cælum extulerunt*. **quamquam....sint**: A. 311. *a*; H. 515. III. N. I. 1.

XXXI. 86. **propendere**: See Lex. s. v. II. A. Cf. XVIII. 51.

87. **horum**: Peripatetics and Academics. Virtue, with these, is the "greater part," the absolute essential to a happy life. **taurum**: See XXVI. 75. **Aristotele**, etc. See X. 30, note. **minis....corrupta**: Zeugma; the *corrupta* goes properly with *blandimentis*, but we need some such word as *territa* for *minis*. **minis aut blandimentis**: Bentley's emendation for *minimis blandimentis*. **complectitur**: as in I. III. 5, *oratorem (=eloquentiam) complexi sumus*. **longe et retro ponenda**. This is the ms. reading. Some editors omit the *et*, others change it to *ei*, the *retro ponenda*=postponenda. **habere se....angustius**, *are in greater straits, i. e.* hampered, because virtue is not with them so essential to a happy life. **desertum illum Carneadem**: His views respecting the chief good, XXX. 84. were not adopted by the later Academics. Antiochus, e. g. starts with the Stoic *prima naturae*, but defining the highest good as life in accordance with man's perfect nature, he includes in it bodily and external goods as well as perfection of reason, and while virtue is deemed sufficient for happiness, it does not suffice for the highest happiness. For this other goods are necessary. We must not allow too much weight to external goods, neither can we ignore them altogether. **nemo est enim eorum quin bonorum**: There are several different readings here, as *nemo est enim qui eorum bonorum*; *nemo est enim quin eorum bonorum*; *nemo est enim quin verorum bonorum*; *nemo est enim eorum qui bonorum*. With our reading the *nemo eorum* refers to those mentioned in the preceding sentence. **animum....esse iudicem**; The thought here and in the following is, that, whatever may be thought by the different schools of the relative importance of the three classes of goods,—goods of the mind, of the body and external goods,—all agree that the mind is the judge; and so all schools approximate the Stoic view that goods of the mind (virtues) are the sole goods—all others being indifferent; for the mind will interpret and soften bodily and external evils even for the

Epicurean whose standard of happiness is pleasure, so that he can be happy in pain. **ea, quae bona malaque;** *i. e. corporis externaque.*

88. **quis:** *Who* of these just named. **voluptarium:** Cf. II. VII. 18, *Epicurus, homo, ut scis voluptarius.* **enim diem quo moritur beatum appellat:** See XXVI. 74, note. **memoria et recordatione:** *reminisci* denotes an act of the mind as momentary, like *in memoriam revocare*; whereas *recordari* denotes it as of some duration, like *revocata in memoriam contemplari*. D. **confutat:** note the primary meaning of this word. **ita sentit, ut....putet:** Pleonasm. Z. 749, 750; so XXXIII. 95, *sic....praecepit, ut....putet.* **sensum extinctum,** *consciousness is destroyed.* Death is annihilation, a dispersion of the atoms constituting the soul. **certa, fixed tenets.** **consolatur;** used with objects personal and impersonal; in the latter case as here = *lenit.*

89. **isti grandiloqui:** the Stoics. Cicero was not in perfect harmony with their ethics. Cf. XXXII. 90, *nostrates philosophi.* **paupertatem:** considered here as an evil—dreaded by the many, regarded with indifference by the philosopher. Hence *Neque tamen, etc.* **Neque....quisquam philosophorum:** [The wise man] “like Epicurus can live on bread and water and at the same time think himself as happy as Zeus.” Zr.

XXXII. **de tenui victu:** Cf. III. XX. 49, *tenuem victum antefert copioso.* Cicero criticises his view as inconsistent, *omnia philosopho digna, sed cum voluptate pugnantia.* **quae res:** *i. e. amoris, ambitioni, etc.*

90. **Scythes Anacharsis:** The importance of the adj. gives it first place. Cf. *Collegae sui consulis, Cn. Octavii, XIX.* 55. *Anacharsis* was brother of a Scythian king and came to Athens about 594 B. C. He made the acquaintance of Solon. The Greeks admired his intelligence and wisdom and the simplicity of his life. His brother slew him on his return home. **nostrates philosophi:** In distinction from foreigners like Anacharsis; with special reference to the Epicureans. **facere:** See Lex. s. v. II. E. **Illiust epistola:** there are several letters extant bearing his name, all of which are regarded as spurious. **Scythicum tegimen:** Cf. Justin. II. 2, (*Scythaæ*) *pellibus ferinis aut murinis utuntur.* **quietum,** *contented, at ease.* **quibus es delectatus:** Greek *οἵς ἐντρυφᾶτε.*

91. **Xenocrates:** See X. 30, note. **talenta:** the word means

"the balance" and "the thing weighed." It was the highest measure of weight among the Greeks, and came to designate a sum of money consisting of coins equal to it in weight and value. The Attic talent is usually meant. The reference is to silver, gold being rarely issued. The *talentum* contains 6,000 drachmae. The *drachma* before the time of Solon contained 6.03 grains=1 s. 1 d. After Solon it retained the same value as a weight, but as a coin it sunk to 4.366 grs.=about 8d. The *talentum*, therefore, was worth about £200, and was not a coin. The largest coin was of the value of ten drachmae. **Athenis praesertim**: Athens, after the war with Philip, was poor in comparison with the Greek cities in Italy and Asia Minor. **tantum**; evidently restrictive here. See Lex. s. v. II. B. **minas**; the *mina* (100 drachmae) was 1.60 of the *talentum*, £3, 6s. 8d.

92. **Diogenes**; 412-393 B. C.—pupil of Antisthenes. He was captured by pirates and sold as a slave to a gentleman of Corinth, who freed him. His interview with Alexander the Great, was at Corinth, and the latter is said to have admired him so greatly as to have said, "If I were not Alexander, I should wish to be Diogenes." See INTRODUCTION. **ut Cynicus**; *i. e.* as was natural, he being a Cynic. **eum** and **eius** as well as **illi** and **ille** refer to *regem Persarum*, the reflexive sufficiently distinguishing the speaker.

XXXIII. 93. **diviserit**; "Desires of the 1st class aim at the removal of pain; those of the 2d at the diversification of pleasure; and those of the 3d at the gratification of vanity, ambition, and empty conceits generally." Cicero in *de Fin.* II. IX. criticises, with some severity, this classification. **paene nihilo**; Abl. price, **neque necessitatem modo sed ne naturam quidem attingerent**, and *have to do neither with necessity nor nature*, *i. e.* are neither necessary nor natural. **neque**=*et non*, and a second *non* is implied in this combination. A. 149. *c*; H. 552. II. Observe the changes of tense in this paragraph—the writer at one time thinking of the existing philosophy, and at another, taking the standpoint of its author.

94. **eaequo voluptates**: *i. e.* of the first and second classes. **extenuatur**, *are disparaged*. **quarum genera....copiam**: the meaning of the author is not entirely clear. Some editors omit *non* before *contemnunt*, but this clause stands in opposition to the words

funditus eiiciendas putavit, which applies to the third class of pleasures, and so seems to require the negative in contrast. Taking *copiam* in the sense of *facultatem* we may understand the sense to be that the Epicureans disparage individual pleasures of the first and second classes, (*i. e.* think them not worthy of much effort) while not rejecting the classes; but they seek them when they may be easily obtained and are harmless, (*v. non obsit*, infra.) See INTRODUCTION. THE EPICUREANS. **non genere aut loco aut ordine**, *not by family, or rank, or station.* **figura** properly denotes shape in its mathematical relation, whereas *forma* is the æsthetical conception of the same. See D. s. *Figura*. The tropical meaning *quality* or *nature* is best here.

95. **optandam [et] expetendam**; better *optandam expeten-damque*. Both words signify a wish,—the latter, in addition, the effort, through others, to realize one's wish. **compensatione**: the tropical use of this noun is confined to Cicero. **voluptatem fugiat**; “He would have pleasure foresworn if it would entail a greater corresponding pain.” **tamen**; rarely found at the end of a sentence.

96. **tam diu, dum**; with *tam diu*—the correlative is often *quam diu*, sometimes *dum* or *quam* alone, or even *quoad*. **sentiret, iungeretur**; Bentley and others emend *sentiat, iungeretur*; but it is not uncommon to find a change in the tenses of the subjunctives dependent on a present indicative [*here praecepit*] which may be considered historical. **memoria**; the abl. without *cum* is common with the participles *iunctus* and *coniunctus*; not so with the verbs.—With the statements in paragraphs 95 and 96 compare the following:

“He [Epicurus] admits that every pleasure, without distinction, is a natural and therefore a good thing, and that every pain is an evil, but demands that, before deciding in favor of a given pleasure or against a certain pain, we weigh its consequences, and that we then adopt or reject it according to the preponderance of pleasure or pain in the result.” *Ueb.*

“Pleasure and pain, further, are either mental or bodily. The more powerful sensations are not, as the Cyrenaics affirmed, bodily but mental; for while the former are confined to the moment, the latter are connected with the past and future, through memory and hope, which thus increase the pleasure of the moment.” *Id.* See INTRODUCTION. See also XXVI. 74, note.

XXXIV. 97. **ad victum**:

"Epicurus then recommends, with special emphasis, moderation, the accustoming of one's self to a simple manner of life, abstinence from costly and intemperate enjoyments, or, at most only a rare indulgence in them, so that health may be preserved and the charm of pleasure may remain undiminished." *Ueb.*

desideriis . . . condiri. Cf. the proverb "*fabas inducet fames*," *hunger sweetens beans* or "*appetite is the best sauce*." **Darius:** *Codomanus* (?), last king of Persia, 336-331 B. C. was conquered by Alexander the Great. The same story is related of Artaxerxes. See in *Plutarch's Lives*, *Artaxerxes*. **Ptolemaeus.** *Ptolemacus* I., *Soter* (?) son of Lagus, reigned 323-285 B. C. He accompanied Alexander the Great. Later he attacked Jerusalem on the Sabbath day and thus made himself master of the city. **cibarius . . . panis.** Cf. Isid. *Orig.* XX. 2, *Panis cibarius est, qui ad cibum servis datur, nec delicatus*; called by Celsus *hordeaceus*. **contentius;** from *contendere*. **opsonare . . . famem;** Cf. *de Fin.* II. XXVIII. 90, *Socratem . . . audio dicentem cibi condimentum esse famem*.

98. **philitiis**; or *pheiditiis*, the Spartan name for the *Syssitia* or daily public meals of the Spartans and Cretans. The meals were confined to men and youth, who were obliged to attend them. The guests were divided into messes of about fifteen members each. The principal dish was meat cooked in blood with a seasoning of salt and vinegar (called black broth [v. *infra*]), with barley bread and wine. Temperance was strictly enforced. These meals served the purpose of uniting the citizens closely by ties of union and intimacy, strengthening the feeling of nationality. At Sparta the messes were formed into corresponding military divisions, and fought more bravely than would mere chance comrades. See *Dict. Antiq.* s. *Syssitia*. **Dionysius; the Elder.** **Quae tandem;** sc. *condimenta*. **ad Eurotam,** along the *Eurotas*. Bentley's emendation for the ms. reading, *ab Eurota*. **ex bestiis;** for *ex bestiarum more*, a case of abbreviated comparison. **ut quicquid obiectum est;** for *ut aliquid obiectum est, quicquid est*.

99. **a Xenophonte:** in the *Cyropaedia*. Cf. *de Fin.* II. XXVIII.
 92. **copia facili,** by the facility with which they are obtained. Cf. *copiam*, XXXIII. 94. **siccitatem,** firmness (of body); freedom from gross humors. See *Lex. s. v.* B. 3.

100. **tum intelleges;** is connected in thought with **Addē . . . addē**, as well as with *confer*.

XXXV. **Timotheum**; Son of Conon, and a distinguished Athenian general; appointed to a public command in 378 B. C. Died in exile. **epistola Platonis**; among Plato's writings are included thirteen letters, which are universally regarded as spurious. The seventh and eighth were perhaps written by Plato's disciples. The former is the most famous of them (here termed *praeclara*) and relates to the assassination of Dion (353 B. C.), between whom and the younger Dionysius he had tried to effect a reconciliation, his third visit to Syracuse (about 365 B. C.) having been fruitlessly made with that object. Cf. XX. 59, *civem suam*, note. **Est.... epistola....ad....propinquos**: note the omission of *scripta*. **Quo cum venissem**: reference is to his first visit to Syracuse, about 389 B. C. when he incurred the displeasure of the elder Dionysius, and is said to have been sold by him into slavery. **ferebatur**: See Lex. s. *fero*, II. 7. **Italicarum Syracusiarumque mensarum**: These were in Greece proverbial for luxury. The word Sybarite, derived from Sybaris, a Greek town in Italy, has come into our language as a synonym of luxury and voluptuousness. **Syracusiarumque**; There are three adjective forms from *Syracuse*, viz : *Syracusanus*, *Syracosius* (Greek) and *Syracusius*. The latter, used here, is rare and is found but twice in Cicero. The second is a collateral form of the third,—and is poetic. **bis in die**; A. 256. a ; H. 429. I. **comitantur huic vitae**. Cf. XXIV. 68, note.

101. **temperari**, to be organized. Cf. I. X. 21, *temperatione*. **Sardanapalli**; according to Ctesias and Diodorus Siculus, Sardanapallus was the last King of the Assyrian (*Syriae=Assyriæ*) empire and destroyed himself in 376 B. C.

The story as told by Ctesias is that he was effeminate and licentious and after suffering a siege of two years collected all his treasures and his wives on an immense pyre and perished with them in the flames. Rawlinson thinks that the Sardanapallus of Ctesias represents both Asshur-dani-pal, and Asshur-emit-ilin (according to him the Saracus of Abydenus), in whose time Assyria fell into the hands of the Medes. On the accession of the former, 667 B. C., the empire was at the height of its glory and magnitude. His buildings were without rival for size and splendor; his palaces were richly adorned with the precious metals and sculpture, and Assyrian culture reached its culminating point. The libraries at Nineveh were the finest that had ever existed, and learned men were attracted to the court. Many valuable cuneiform inscriptions belong to this reign. It is also said of Saracus that he burned himself in his palace on the revolt of Nabopolassar, father of the Nebuchadrezzar of the Scriptures.

Haec babeo; Cic. quotes but two of the six verses of which the inscription consists. Strabo gives it entire. **iacent**; *are lost*.

102. **cur=cui rei**, to which corresponds the reply in the datives *signis, tabulis, ludis*. **ubi=qua in re.** **paupertas**; corresponds to *tenues homines, men of slender means*. See below. **pungit aliquid**: conscience troubles them, because most of these works of art found in Roman houses and villas were forcibly or secretly taken from Greek cities and temples.

XXXVI. 103. **popularis offensio, unpopularity**. In §106 the same is expressed in the words, *offensam populi voluntatem*; opposed to *gratia popularis* or *aura popularis*, or, as below, *commendatio in vulgus*. Cf. Hor. *Arbitrio popularis aurae*. **vide ne**; a modest form of expression. Cf. I. XXXIV. 83. Z. 534. **leviculus, somewhat vain**. Found only here in this sense. **Quid hoc levius**: Pliny the younger, *Epist. IX. 23*, takes a different view of the case; *Demosthenes iure laetus est, quod illum anus Attica ita noscitavit; Οὗτος ἐστι Αἰγαοθέντης, apud alios*; See Lex. s. *apud*. B. 2. d. **non multum ipse secum**; elsewhere Cicero speaks much more considerately and justly of Demosthenes, e. g. *Or. VII. 23, hoc nec gravior exstitit quisquam nec callidior nec temperantior*.

104. **Democritus**; A Greek philosopher born at Abdera in Thrace—about 460 B. C.,—the founder, with Leucippus, of the Atomic theory of Greek philosophy. Although he traveled a great deal, it is not certain that he was ever at Athens. However Valerius Maximus writes: [Democritus] *Athenis compluribus annis moratus....ignotus illi urbi vixit, quod ipse in quodam volumine testatur. a gloria....afuisse, indifferent to fame. An tibicines, etc.* Cf. I. XIV. 31, *Ergo arbores seret....vir magnus....non seret? multo arte maiore*; A. 344. g. and b. note; H. 561. III. **aliquid esse**; *aliquid* in this use=*aliquid magnum*. See Lex. s. v. II. C. 1. Cf. I. XX. 45. **ambitiones, canvassing for office**. How does *ambitus* differ from *ambitio*? **ante quam poenitere coepit**; Cicero reflects bitterly on his own experience.

105. **est**; often used alone to introduce quotations=*scriptum est*. **Heraclitum**; *Heraclitus, of Ephesus*—about 535-475 B. C., called “*the Obscure*.” He held that the ultimate principle of all existence is *fire*, and that all things are in a constant flux or flow.

Plato and especially the Stoics were indebted to Heraclitus. Fragments of his great work "*On Nature*," have come down to us.

Hermodoro: *Hermodorus* is said to have gone to Rome after his expulsion, and to have assisted the decemvirs in drawing up the laws of the Twelve Tables, 451 B. C. **unus;** adds emphasis. Cf. *unus quisque* and *unus* with superlatives. **excellat, sit;** A. 266; H. 483. **exsuperantiam;** occurs only here in Cicero. **Aristides;** "the Just,"—fl. 490-471 B. C.,—was the political opponent of Themistocles. He was ostracized but recalled, and died very poor but highly honored. **Graecorum quam nostra;** sc. *exempla. contrahunt, have dealings, intercourse;* a business term but used beyond the sphere of business. **iis litteris;** in same construction as *otio litterato.*

XXXVII. 106. **credo:** ironical as in XXXV. 102. **paulo ante dictus est:** At XXXVI. 103. **abesse patria;** Cicero usually repeats the preposition. He uses *abesse* to designate his banishment from Rome. **bonis:** A. 220. b. 1, and 252. note; H. 410. III.

107. **parum multa;** Cf. I. XLV. 109, *parum diu. rerum naturam;* i. e. the reality. **Xenocrates;** See X. 30, note. He accompanied Plato to Syracuse, and was sent on repeated embassies to Philip of Macedonia. He was a native of Chalcedon. **Crantor;** of Soli in Cilicia, an Academic philosopher and disciple of Xenocrates—about 300 B. C. His most celebrated work was "*On Grief*," of which Cicero made much use in his *Consolatio.* Cf. I. XLVIII.

115. **Arcesilas:** A native of Pitane in Aeolis, and founder of the second or Middle Academy. Fl. 250 B. C. A disciple of Theophrastus, Polemo and Crantor. **Lacydes:** A native of Cyrene and successor of Arcesilas as president of the Academy at Athens. Died 215 B. C. **Aristoteles;** See X. 30, note. **Theophrastus;** See IX. 24, note. **Zeno;** See IX. 27, note. **Cleanthes:** A disciple and the successor of *Zeno* 263 B. C., born at Assos in Troas. His Hymn to Zeus is still extant. It is given in full in Ueberweg, and the translation in Peter's "Specimens of Ancient Poets," and in Cocker's "Christianity and Greek Philosophy." **Chrysippus:** One of the greatest of the Stoics, born at Soli in Cilicia in 280 B. C.; a disciple of *Cleanthes*, and the first to put Stoicism on a sound rational basis. He is called the second founder of the school, and it was said that "without Chrysippus the Stoa had not existed." **Anti-**

pater: Another Stoic, born at Tarsus, and fl. 144 B. C. **Carnades**: See IV. 11, note. **Panaetius**: A Stoic, native of Rhodes, disciple of *Antipater*, at Rome the friend of Laelius and the younger Scipio Africanus. Died at Athens about 111 B. C. **Clitomachus**: A Carthaginian, disciple of *Carnades* at Athens, and his successor as the head of the Middle Academy, B. C. 129. **Philo**: of Larissa, a disciple of *Clitomachus*. He settled in Rome B. C. 88, and Cicero listened to his lectures. **Antiochus**: See VIII. 22, note. **Posidonius**: A Stoic, from Apamea in Syria,—B. C. 135,—studied under Panaetius at Athens. He traveled widely and then settled in Rhodes, where Cicero attended his lectures. Afterwards he came to Rome. **At enim sine ignominiaadficere sapientem**; This reading of the best mss. is plainly incomplete. Various readings have been proposed. Other mss. have *non* before *sine* and the word *poterit* is found in a few. The word *ignominia* may have occurred twice in the original and an early copyist failed by oversight to repeat it, the error being perpetuated. Hence Orelli's emendation, '*At enim sine ignominia.*' *Ignominia poterit afficere sapientem?* May not the reading possibly be, *At enim non sine ignominia afficere poterit sapientem*, where *exsilium* is supplied from above as subject of *poterit*? Heine suggests that the omission might be supplied thus: '*At enim sine ignominia [horum exilium fuit.] An poterit quicquam ignominia] afficere sapientem.*' Tischer reads, '*At enim sine ignominia.*' *An potest exsilium ignominia adficere sapientem?* **At enim**: the *enim* introduces a reason for the objection implied in *at.* **non oportet**: What kind of obligation denoted by *oportet*? See D. s. *Necesse est.*

108. **queant**: denotes ability as the consequence of complete qualification. D. s. *Posse*. Cf. *Barbari....ferro decertare acer- rime possunt, degrotare viriliter non queunt;* and infra, XLI. 118, *quas ferre nequeas*. **Patria est**, etc. From the *Teucer*, a tragedy of Pacuvius. What is the story of Teucer, son of Telamon? Cf. Hor. *Od. I. 7, vs. 21–32*. Cf. also Pub. Syr. *patria tua est ubicumque vixeris bene*. The sentence became a proverb with the Greeks and Romans. **Mundanum**: a word coined by Cicero, and occurring as an adjective in late Latin. The apothegm here stated is frequently quoted, and is sometimes attributed to other philosophers. **T. Albucius**: A careful student of Greek literature;—satirized by Lucilius. He

was praetor in Sardinia in 105 B. C.; was afterwards condemned for extortion. He retired to Athens and pursued the study of philosophy. An adherent of the Epicurean school. **Epicuri legibus:** Epicurus taught that the "wise man" should not entangle himself in the affairs of state.

109. **in patria:** See IX. 26, note. **Metrodorus:** A native of Lampsacus (some say of Athens), a distinguished disciple of Epicurus. Metrodorus made happiness consist in having a well-constituted body; a good digestion was his test of happiness. See IX. 27, note. **Plato, Polemo:** natives of Athens. **Xenocrates, Arcesilas:** strangers who had moved to Athens. **Damaratus:** the Doric form for *Demaratus*; a noble of Corinth, who, when Cypselus overthrew his clan, 657 B. C., fled to Etruria and settled at Tarquinii. **tyrannum Cypselum:** reigned from 658 to 628 B. C. For the origin of his name see Clas. Dict.

XXXVIII. 110. **sollicitudines:** has reference to *future* evils, *aegritudines* to *present* ills. How does the latter word differ in meaning from *aegrotatio*? **traductis animis:** The Epicureans taught that every being naturally seeks to acquire happiness which is synonymous with pleasure, that virtue is the only sure path to happiness, and that the wise man possesses virtue and is, therefore, always happy. Yet, virtue is not the chief good, but pleasure, and the former is chosen for the sake of the latter. **in pluribus bonis esse, abounds in good things.** **ut sapiens semper beatus sit:** after speaking at length of blindness and deafness in the following paragraphs, Cicero resumes the thread of thought here broken off in paragraph 119.

111. **aspectu:** *aspectus* differs from *conspectus*, as the active from the passive. D. **non versari in, are not concerned with;** i. e. not the eyes but the mind receives pleasure in the sight of a pleasing object, while with the senses of taste, smell, touch and hearing the organs of sense are the seat of pleasure. **in oculis tale nihil fit:** a change is here made to the direct discourse. **animus accipit quae videmus:** Cf. I. XX. 46, *animum et videre et audire*. But with the Epicureans all sensation is reduced to touch—it is produced by the impact upon the various organs of sense, of infinitely small, film-like emanations from bodies. **non ferme=non fere, not easily.**

adhibet oculos advocatos, avails *hi* itself of (needs) the aid of the eyes.

112. **Antipatri**: Antipater is said to have been a disciple of Aristippus, the founder or the Cyrenaic school. Not the Antipater mentioned in paragraph 107. See notes. **est quidem**: Editors now write **est id quidem**, as required by the Latin idiom. When an opposition between two predicates occurs, *quidem* is never added to the verb or adjective unless the subject in the form of a pronoun is repeated. **obscenius**: A. 93, *a*; H. 444. I. **Appium**: *Appius Claudius Caecus* was of a proud aristocratic family. When censor (312 B. C.) he built the Appian aqueduct and commenced the famous Appian way. He was consul in 307 and in 296. In 280 he was carried into the Senate house, and in an eloquent speech persuaded the senate to reject the terms of peace proposed by Pyrrhus and brought by Cineas. Cf. *Cat. M.* 6. 16 and 11. 37. **C. Drusi**: This Drusus, distinguished as a jurist and an orator, was a brother of M. Livius Drusus who was the ablest of the Roman demagogues and patron of the Italians. **Pueris nobis**: In what year was Cicero born? When die? **Cn. Aufidius**: Was quaestor in 119 B. C., tribunus plebis in 114, and praetor in 108. Cf. *de Fin.* V. XIX. 54, *Evidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetoris, eruditio homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, quam se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret.* **Graecam....historiam**: "Of his *Graeca historia* we possess no fragments; but there is no doubt it treated of the history of Rome." *Teuffel*.

XXXIX. 113. **Diodotus**: A teacher of Cicero, especially in dialectics; died in the year 59 B. C. at Cicero's house, and left the latter a property worth about a hundred thousand sesterces, (nearly \$50,000). Learned Greeks enjoyed the literary society of distinguished Romans, and became members of Roman families for that purpose, often instructing the children although in no need of such means of support. **domui**: the locative form of *domus* in the fourth declension. A. 70. *g.* **quod credibile vix esset**: There is an ellipsis of the condition, *if I had not myself witnessed it.* **cum....versaretur et cum....uteretur, cumque....legerentur....tum....tuebatur**: A. 326, *b*; H. 521. 2. 2). Note 1. **Pythagoreorum more**: The Greeks gave considerable attention to music, while with the Romans there was little if any native develop-

ment of it. The early Romans knew nothing of stringed instruments, the short and slender Latian flute with four holes being their sole musical instrument. The Greeks had a number of instruments. Pythagoras studied music scientifically and discovered the numerical relations of the octave, the fifth and the fourth. The Pythagorean school continued the investigations. Aristoxenus (see I. X. 20), a pupil of Aristotle and a Pythagorean, was the greatest authority on music among the ancients. It may be added that the mathematician Euclid and the astronomer Ptolemaeus wrote on music. **legerentur**=*recitarentur*. **munus tuebatur**, attended to the duties of a teacher. Cf. I. XLV. 109, *virtutis functus est munere*. **Asclepiadem**: Asclepiades of Phlius,—300 B. C.—friend and disciple of Menedemus of Eretria, who founded the Eretrian school. The teachings of this school are little known but are said to resemble those of the Megarian school. The latter united the views of the Eleatics with the ethical and dialectical principles of Socrates. Cf. Acad. II, XLII. 129, *A Menedemo autem, quod is Eretria fuit, Eretriaci appellati, quorum omne bonum in mente positum ac mentis acie, qua verum cerneatur.* **puero ut uno esset comitator**: The allusion is to the custom of the wealthy being escorted by friends and clients. Asclepiades, although without such attendance, says in jest that his blindness has added another to his attendants, namely a boy to lead him about. **ut....esset comitator**: A result clause. Cicero frequently employs *comitatus* in a passive sense. **si liceat**: sc. *parasitari* or *mendicare*. Many Greek scholars at Rome stood in the relation of parasites to wealthy Romans. Cicero would not degrade them.

114. **luminibus amissis**: This is doubtful. The tradition is that he deprived himself of sight in order that he might the better concentrate his thoughts on philosophic study. **scilicet**: concessive. **bona mala**: See XXVI. 73, note. R. 2204. **magna parva**: not in the sense of size. **aspectu oculorum**, the sense or power of sight. Cf. I. XXX. 73, *aspectum omnino amitterent*; and XXXVIII. III. *oculorum* is a subjec. gen. **ille....peregrinabatur**: sc. *animo*. His knowledge was extensive; no Greek before Aristotle was as learned; and he left works on physics, ethics, astronomy, mathematics, art, and literature, of which scanty fragments remain. The lively and attractive style of his writings is praised. **Homerum**

caecum fuisse; The tradition that Homer was blind in his old age may have arisen from the fancy that the blind singer in the *Odyssey* was a prototype of Homer, and because the author of the hymn to the Delian Apollo, (supposed by the ancients to be Homer), represented him as blind. **picturam**; Lucian calls Homer '*Ο ἄριστος τῶν γραφέων, the best of painters.*

115. **Anaxagoras**; See IV. 10. Anaxagoras died in quasi banishment at Lampsacus. He gave philosophy a home at Athens, and is above all distinguished as the first philosopher to introduce a spiritual element beside the material—a sort of dualism. Cf. I. XI.III. 104. **Tiresiam**; The blind soothsayer of Thebes. His blindness is variously accounted for. He possessed the gift of prophecy, and figures in the wars of the *Seven against Thebes* and the *Epigoni*. **Polyphemum**: Cicero seems to be in error in referring this story to Homer as it does not occur there. There were different conceptions of the Cyclopes, (round-eyed ones) among the ancients. Hesiod makes them the sons of Uranus and Gaea, and three in number, with a single eye in the forehead. They later forged Jove's thunderbolts. Homer represents them as living a pastoral life, and a later age placed them in Sicily and identified them with the Cyclopes of Hesiod. Polyphemus appears in Homer as suffering the deprivation of his eye by the cunning device of Odysseus. A later legend made him the lover of the nymph Galatea, and the poets Philoxenus and Theocritus have made the story famous. Propertius says, "*quin etiam, Polypheme, fera Galatea sub Aetna ad tua rorantes carmina flexit equos.*" It was a third variety of Cyclopes that built the Cyclopean walls at Mycenae, Tiryns, Argos, etc. **colloquentem** **facit eiusque laudare fortunas**: Observe the two constructions after *facit*, in the sense of *representing*. Z. 618. Note; A. 292. e; H. 535. I. 4, and see Lex. s. v. B. 4 (γ). **fortunas**; For other instances of the use of the plural for the sing. of this word, see Lex. s. *fortuna*, 2. B. *fin.*

XL. 116. **surdaster**: a form of the diminutive, of rare occurrence. This word occurs only here. Cf. *oleaster*, *parasitaster*, *pianaster*, and our *poetaster*. See Roby, vol. I. 889. **M. Crassus**: surnamed *Dives*, the triumvir. He was a shrewd speculator, and had the reputation of being avaricious. **male audiebat**: The word

audire has here the sense “*to be named, or styled somehow*” (as Greek $\delta\chiούω$). Thus *male audire*=*to be in ill repute, to hear evil of one's self*= $\chiαχω\zeta \delta\chiονειν$. Cicero plays upon words; for being a little deaf (*surdaster*), *male audiebat* would be true of Crassus in two senses. See Lex. s. *audio* II. D. **Epicurei**: This word is found in all mss. Wolf rejects it. It may be simply one of Cicero's thrusts at the school whose teachings he opposes. Cf. I. III. 5, 6. **omnesque [id]....surdi**: *id* is omitted in some mss. If it stands, it makes with *surdi* an anacoluthon. A better reading is *item* in place of *id*, and remove the brackets from *surdi*. **legendis his**: *his=cantibus*, i. e. the words or verses.

117. **paulo ante**; At XXXVIII. 111. **secum loqui**: See XXXVI. 103. **captus sit=privatus sit**. See Lex. s. *capio* I. B. 1. e. **primum**; correlative to *sin forte*. **quid est....quod laboremus**; A. 320; H. 503. I. Note 2. **portus enim praesto est**; Cf. I. XXX. 74. In the Stoic ethics life is regarded as among things indifferent, suicide is permitted as a rational means of terminating it, but only by the sage. **ibidem**; at the time when suffering most. This word is omitted by some editors, and Bentley omits as a silly gloss *quoniam mors ibidem est*, and T. brackets the words. Others insert *quidem* after *quoniam*. **nihil sentiendi**; Cf. I. XLIII. 102, *de nihil sentiendo*. **Theodorus**: of Cyrene, designated as *the Atheist*, a disciple of Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school. See INTRODUCTION. He went to Athens and later to Alexandria, finally returning to Cyrene. While in the service of Ptolemy, king of the Macedonian dynasty in Egypt, he was sent $\tilde{\alpha}\pi$ an embassy to Lysimachus, king of Thrace, who threatened to crucify him on account of his freedom of speech. Cf. I. XLIII. 102. **vero**; ironical. **Cantharidis vim**; the *cantharis* was used by the ancients as a poison. It is a question whether it was the same insect that is now known by that name—the Spanish fly—which is bruised and used as a vesicatory. Cic. says, *C. Carbo, accusante L. Crasso, Cantharidas sumpsisse dicitur. Ad. Fam. IX. 21. 3.*

118. **Paulus**; *L. Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus* (230–160 B.C.) was one of the most upright of the Roman nobles. In his second consulship, 168 B. C., he defeated (on June 2d) at Pydna, the last king of Macedonia, Perseus. The triumph of Paulus was celebrated

Nov. 30th, 167, and before the triumphal car walked the captive king and his children. **Persi**; Perses was cast into a dungeon after the triumph of Paulus, but was released at the intercession of the latter and permitted to end his days in an honorable captivity at Alba. *Perses* is declined as an *a* or *e* stem, but Sallust and Tacitus write the gen. *Persi*, and Cicero and Livy have the same form for the dative. In this passage some editors have *Persae*, and Roby I. 482, remarks, "The name of the Macedonian king *Perseus* had an *e* stem used in Cicero, and an *eu* stem used in Livy. Other writers generally follow Livy."

XLI. **obtinetur**, is observed; not *obtinet* because this verb is never neuter in Cicero. See Lex. **aut bibat and abeat**: The Greek has γίνεσθαι γίγνεσθαι, either drink or depart, and the German *sauf oder lauf*. **inquit**: indefinite subject. **violentiam vinolentorum**: A play upon words. Cf. III. XXVII. 64, *Pueros vero matres.... castigare....solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus*. **Haec eadem**: See XXXVIII. 110, and II. VI. 15. **Hieronymus**: of Rhodes, a Peripatetic. See XXX. 84. He held that the highest good consists in freedom from pain, cf. II. VI. 15; while Aristotle taught that complete happiness results from the rational and virtuous activity of the soul, together with the presence of certain external goods. See IX. 25, note.

119. **ut virtus per se ipsa nihil valeat**: What was the Epicurean view of the relation of virtue to pleasure? **profectis**: from *proficisci*. Dat. **Quorum alii**: The Peripatetics and the Academics. See XVI. 47; XXVI. 75 and notes. **alii autem**: The Stoics. See VIII. 22; X. 29, note.

120. **honorarius arbiter**: *i. e.* chosen by the parties and not by the praetor. For the functions, etc. of the arbiter see Morey's *Outlines of Roman Law*, pg. 390. **Carneades**: See XXIX. 83, note. **commoda=praecipua**. See XVI. 47, note. **causam esse discrepandi**: Cf. XXVI. 75, note. **hunc locum, this point**; *i. e.* respecting the *summum bonum*, and that a wise man lives happily. **ceterarum disciplinarum**: Of other schools than those just mentioned, which in *re* if not in *verbis* agreed with one another. **voce=sententia**.

121. **eundum**: To the city from his Tuscan villa. **ubi**, wherein=*how*. **cuicuimodi**: Roby I. 382; A. 105, b. Note; H.

187. 4. Note. **alteros quinque**: He had already written and dedicated to Brutus the five books *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*. **lacessiti**: Cic. may refer to Brutus' work, *De Virtute*, which was dedicated to him. See I. i. **profuturi simus....dixerim**: Observe the change of number. It is not probable that Cicero intended to include Brutus in the plural verb any more than in the *nostris* following.


Without doubt Cicero alleviated very materially his personal sorrows and his political anxieties by the congenial diversion of philosophical study and composition.

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